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Comments
NEWSGATHERING AFTER THE DEATH OF A PRINCESS:
DO AMERICAN LAWS ADEQUATELY PUNISH AND DETER
NEWSGATHERING CONDUCT THAT PLACES INDIVIDUALS
IN FEAR OR AT RISK OF BODILY HARM?
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1997, Princess Diana of Wales died from injuries
she suffered in a car accident.' Investigators believed that several
factors contributed to the crash, including the pursuit of Princess
Diana's car by several members of the paparazzi. 2 French magis-
trates, however, have since ruled that the pursuing paparazzi played
no role in the accident.3 Rather, the magistrates determined that
the accident "was caused by the fact that the driver of the car was
1. See, e.g., Kamal Ahmed and David Pallister, Spotlight/Conspiracy Theories: Di-
ana: The Facts and the Fiction That Fail to Add Up, GUARDiAN (London), Feb. 14,
1998; Paparazzi Relentless in Pursuit of Their Famous Prey Princess Diana: 1961-1997,
Photographers May Be to Blame in Fatal Crash in Paris; Diana Had Called the Press 'Fero-
cious', S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 31, 1997, at A4; Craig R. Whitney, Diana Killed in a Car
Accident in Paris; In Fight from Paparazzi-Friend Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at
Al. Diana and companion Dodi Al Fayed were in a limousine, driven by chauffeur
Henri Paul, traveling through a Paris tunnel. See Diana's Chauffeur Drank at Bar as
She and Dodi had Last Meal, ATENCE FRANCE-PREsSE, Dec. 13, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13453797. Also in the car was the Princess' bodyguard, Trevor Reese Jones.
See id. The limousine had just left a hotel owned by Al Fayed's family, where the
couple had dashed out a back door to avoid media members gathered at the front.
See The Death of Princess Diana, NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1997, at A40. Photographers on
motorbikes and in cars caught up with the limousine and pursued the couple in
search of headlines. See Paparazzi Relentless in Pursuit of Their Famous Prey Princess
Diana: 1961-1997, supra at A4. While inside the tunnel, the limousine crashed. See
id. Al Fayed and Paul died on impact. See id. Diana was given medical assistance
on the scene and at a French hospital where she later died. See id. The bodyguard
suffered horrendous injuries. See Diana's Chauffeur Drank at Bar as She and Dodi had
Last Meal supra. Mr. Jones underwent extensive surgery and has since been able to
remember more about the night of the crash but nothing about the actual crash.
See id.
2. See Ahmed and Pallister, Spotlight/Conspiracy Theories: Diana: The Facts and
the Fiction That Fail to Add Up, supra note 1; see also Howard Kurtz, Pictures at a High
Price: Paparazzi Take More Than Celebrities' Photos, THE WASHINGTON PosT, Sept. 1,
1997, at Al; New Zealand Prime Minister Says Diana Hounded by Media, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 1, 1997; Report Puts Small Car Near Diana Crash Scene, TIMES
UNION, Jan. 2, 1998, at A13; The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 10,
1998). The factors believed to have contributed to the crash include the paparazzi
in hot pursuit and the driver's blood alcohol level. See id.
3. SeeJohn-Thor Dahlburg, Charges Dropped Against Paparazzi Implicated in Prin-
cess Diana Crash, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1999, at A6.
(171)
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inebriated and under the effects of drugs incompatible with alco-
hol."4 Regardless of legal causation and ultimate liability, people
from all over the world were saddened by the sudden death of the
Princess.5 Moreover, people were alarmed by the activities of the
paparazzi who pursued Princess Diana's car before the accident,
and subsequently photographed the accident scene. 6
Although further investigation has revealed that the media was
not solely to blame for the accident, 7 the initial reaction and
residual effect of the tragedy has been widespread concern that the
media's conduct may have contributed to Princess Diana's death.8
The media has been flooded with comments about privacy protec-
tions and media accountability.9
4. Paul Webster and Stuart Miller, Diana Verdict Sparks Fayed Appeal THE
GuARDIAN, Sept. 4, 1999 (citations omitted). The father of Dodi Al Fayed vowed to
appeal the decision of the French magistrates, claiming that the paparazzi shared
responsibility for the accident. See id. Although the elder Fayed is entitled to an
appeal of the magistrates' decision under French law, few expect a reversal. See
Dahlburg, supra note 3, at A6.
5. See From Angola to Asia, Grief and Anger, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 2, 1997, at
A7. "Princess Diana's death over the weekend continued to ignite an outpouring
of grief from around the world today." Id.; see also Ian Black, The Death of Diana:
World Tributes: Clinton and Wife are Profoundly Saddened by Loss, GuARDIAN, Sept. 1,
1997, at 7; Paul Cullen, World Leaders Unite in Admiration and Praise for Her Humani-
tarianism, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at 9; The Today Show (NBC television broad-
cast, Sept. 1, 1997); The World Responds, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 1997, at A20. London
was "in a state of shock." Id.
6. See New Zealand Prime Minister Says Diana Hounded by Media, supra note 2;
Good Morning America: Paparazzi Legislation (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 18,
1998) (discussing Personal Privacy Protection Act proposed by Senators Feinstein
and Boxer and Representative Hatch before 105th Congress in May 1998). In the
aftermath of the death of Princess Diana, there was a lot of talk about the
paparazzi. See id. Six months later, "it's still not clear what role they played in the
accident that killed the Princess in Paris last August. But the ensuing controversy
that involved the paparazzi may lead to new laws in this country." Id.; see also Philip-
pine Press in Soul-Searching After Diana's Death, AGENCE FP.ANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 1, 1997.
7. See Report Puts Small Car Near Diana Crash Scene, supra note 2, at A13. Henri
Paul, the limousine's driver, had a blood alcohol level of approximately three
times the legal limit. See id. Many believe that his drunken state while driving
caused the accident. See id. Others believe that the driver under the influence of
alcohol and under the conditions created by the photographers on motorcycles
and in cars caused the accident. See id.
8. See Arthur Spiegelman, US: Senate Bill Would Shield Stars from Paparazzi, AAP
Newsfeed, Feb. 18, 1998 (discussing bill proposed by Senators Dianne Feinstein,
Barbara Boxer and Orrin Hatch in response to Princess Diana's death). "The
Hollywood community erupted after Diana's death last year, charging that she
would never have died except for the desire of her driver to escape Paris paparazzi
trying to photograph her with boyfriend Dodi Fayed." Id.; see also Howard Kurtz,
Public to Press: Just Play Fair; They're Peeved by Intrusiveness and Deception. But are New
Laws the Answer?, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Kurtz, Public to
Press: Just Play Fair].
9. SeeJoe Rush, Press Must Police Itself on Celebrity Coverage, STAR-LEDGER, Sept.
30, 1997, at 20. "Never have newspapers been broadsided with more rancor than
[Vol. 6: p. 171
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Photographers and reporters had long hounded Princess Di-
ana.10 They had a history of invading the Princess' private mo-
ments.'" It is uncontested that the accident occurred while her
limousine driver was trying to escape the photographers who were
chasing the limousine. 12 Consequently, commentators worldwide
declared that increased privacy protections are essential to prevent
similar tragedies. 13 For example,just a few days after Diana's death,
was stirred by Princess Diana's death while in flight from a pack of paparazzi
wolves.... Since Diana's accident, proposals to legally curb and punish newspa-
pers guilty of invading privacy have proliferated." Id.; see also Kurtz, Public to Press:
Just Play Fair, supra note 9, at B4; Roy Greenslade, British Press Dips Its Toes in Ethical
Waters-For Now Media: Are the Tabloids Really Sincere in Mending Their Ways or Just
Ducking the Public Salvos?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at B5; Nat Henoff, Who Calls
the Shots if Photographers Face New Curbs?, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 29, 1997, at 23; Joseph
Perkins, Intrusions Demand a New Federal Privacy Law, FLORIDA TODAY, Sept. 19,
1997, at A9; James C. Goodale and Jeremy Feigelson, Greater Legal Restrictions on the
Paparazzi? No, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 2, col. 4;JeniferJoyce, Lost Photo Opportu-
nities: First Amendment Experts Question Constitutionality of Proposals to Prevent Harass-
ment by Paparazzi, 83-NOV A.B.A.J. 36 (1997); Robert M. O'Neil, Revive News Council
to Curb Press, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at A23, col. 1; Paparazzi Overreaction, TIMES
UNION, Sept. 22, 1997, at A6; Alison Boshoff, New Code of Practice for the Press Un-
veiled, DAILY TELEGRAPH LONDON, Dec. 19, 1997.
Throughout the media, journalists urged the public to distinguish serious
journalists from the paparazzi. See Face the Nation, (CBS television broadcast, Aug.
31, 1997). Guest Gloria Borger, of US News and World Report, commented that
the paparazzi are mutants and stalkers, notjournalists. See id. Not only did main-
stream or "respectable" journalists seek to distance themselves from the paparazzi
but even tabloid news magazine editors, like Steve Coz of the National Enquirer,
tried to distance their papers. See id. Also a guest on Face the Nation, Coz asserted
that a difference exists between media who would photograph Princess Diana wav-
ing from Al Fayed's boat and the paparazzi who would chase her down by car. See
id. Coz claimed that only a small contingent of paparazzi around the world engage
in this chasing behavior and that his paper discouraged chasing. See id.
10. See New Zealand Prime Minister Says Diana Hounded by Media, supra note 2.
At a luncheon a few weeks before her death, the Princess told Andrew Roberts, a
reporter with The Sunday Times, that she would leave England because of its re-
lentless reporters, were it not for her sons. See id.
11. See Paparazzi Relentless in Pursuit of Their Famous Prey: Princess Diana 1961-
1997, supra note 1. Photographs of Diana and Al Fayed had recently appeared in
London newspapers. See id. Certainly, the night of the accident was believed to
have been one of those private moments upon which the paparazzi intruded. Ap-
parently, Dodi Al Fayed had planned the romantic evening to end with a marriage
proposal. See Elaine Ganley, Death of Princess Diana: Princess was Given Diamond Ring
Hours Before Death, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Sept. 4, 1997, at 7. Al Fayed had in fact
given Diana a $204,500 diamond ring hours before the fatal crash. See id. The ring
was found in the limousine and turned over to Diana's sisters. See id.
12. See Kurtz, Pictures at a High Price, supra note 2, at Al. The routine and
relentless pursuit of famous figures by paparazzi turned "chillingly dangerous...
where a car accident killed Princess Diana and her friend Dodi Al Fayed as their
driver raced to elude several paparazzi on cars and motorcycles." Id.; see also Faye
Fiore, Senator, Actors Focus on Bill to Curb Paparazzi, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at Al.
13. See Proposed US Bill Would Rein in Paparazzi, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb.
18, 1998. The death of Princess Diana propelled United States Senators Dianne
Feinstein and Orrin Hatch to propose federal privacy legislation. See id. Anti-
1999]
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two California lawmakers proposed measures to increase the state's
protections for celebrities hounded by paparazzi. 14
Specifically, the tragedy of Princess Diana's death has sparked
debate about media conduct that places individuals in fear or at risk
of bodily harm.' 5 There are two issues involved: First, whether
such conduct can be punished; and second, whether proposed
paparazzi legislation was first considered two years before. See id. The bill was put
on hold until the death of the Princess "brought the seriousness of the problem
home with a blunt force that stunned the world." Id.; see also Fiore, supra note 12,
at Al.
Senator Feinstein has argued that state laws are too unpredictable to ade-
quately protect victims. See Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein Upon Introduc-
tion of the Personal Privacy Protection Act, May 20, 1998 http://www.senate.gov/
member/ca/feinstein/general/speeches/paparazzi2.hmL This unpredictability is due to
the fact that some laws are not codified or not well defined due to a lack of prece-
dent. See id. Arguably, both the press and their subjects may suffer harm as a
result of unpredictable laws. See Lyrissa C. Barnett, Note: Intrusion and the Investiga-
tive Reporter, 71 TEx. L. RExv. 433, 449 (1992) (discussing dangerous ramifications of
ill-defined legal boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate newsgathering
techniques). Of course, the counterveiling concern exists that unpredictable tort
doctrine in this area will chill speech. See Stephen M. Stern, WitchHunt or Protected
Speech: Striking a First Amendment Balance Between Newsgathering and General Laws, 37
WASHBURN LJ. 115, 116 (1997) ("This was the same concern that compelled the
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to provide First Amendment
safeguards.").
Public figures demanded increased privacy protections in the newsgathering
context long before Diana's death, partly because Diana's death was not the first
time the media had endangered its subjects. See Michelle DeArmond, Paparazzi
Clash with Celbs: Stars Fight Back When it's Their Privacy v. Profit, Rocxy MOUNTAIN
NEws, Aug. 31, 1997, at A78. Four months before Diana's fatal accident, "Arnold
Schwarzenegger and his wife, Maria Shriver, were ambushed by celebrity photogra-
phers and trapped in their Mercedes Benz between two cars piloted by paparazzi."
Id. At the time, "Shriver was pregnant and Schwarzenegger had recently been re-
leased from the hospital after heart surgery." Di Mari Ricker, The Wild, Wild Press,
26 STUDENT LAWYER, vol. 6, at 27 (1998). Some commentators believe that the
media's newsgathering conduct has gotten worse. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bring-
ing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places,
73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1010 (1995). "We live in an increasingly intrusive, uncivil
society" where outrageousness by the media and public interest in outrageousness
feed each other. See id at 1009-17. "The media's willingness to print just about
anything about just about anybody carries over to the methods media representa-
tives use to gather information." Id. at 1013.
14. See Cassandra Sweet, Death Prompts California Lawmakers to Seek More Celeb-
rity Protection, AP NEWSWiRE, Sept. 2, 1997 (available at http://www.dnai.com/qqbrurol
diana.htm). "Amidst outcries from movie stars that what happened to Diana could
happen to them, Sens. Tom Hayden . . . and Charles Calderon . . . have an-
nounced separate proposals to better protect celebrities from the often-ruthless
pursuit of paparazzi." Id. While slightly different in their approaches, both state
Senators' proposals included a "physical space barrier between the unwilling sub-
ject and photographers." Id.
15. See, e.g., Face the Nation, (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 31, 1997); Proposed
US Bill Would Rein in Paparazzi, supra note 13; Ricker, supra note 13, at 26;
Spiegelman, supra note 8; The Today Show, (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 1,
1997).
[Vol. 6: p. 171
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methods will deter such conduct. Because commentators have re-
sponded to Princess Diana's accident by asserting that existing laws
are inadequate to prevent future tragedies, it is important to deter-
mine the efficacy of the existing measures as well as the potential
success of alternative measures. 16
Section II of this Comment provides background on the
Supreme Court's balancing of free speech and privacy issues with
respect to media conduct. 17 Section III of this Comment addresses
the laws currently in place in the American legal system for punish-
ing media conduct that places an individual in fear or at risk of
bodily harm.1 8 Section IV discusses the measures currently existing
to deter media conduct that places an individual in fear or at risk of
bodily harm.19 Section V concludes that existing laws are sufficient
to punish, but insufficient to deter, dangerous media conduct. Sec-
tion V suggests additional deterrent measures. 20
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."2 1 The history
of these freedoms are long and extensive, reflecting the importance
of these freedoms as "cornerstone [s] of liberty and basic to the
existence of constitutional democracy."22
16. See Proposed US Bill Would Rein in Paparazzi, supra note 13. Senator Fein-
stein, for example, asserts that there is a line between legitimate newsgathering
and invasion of privacy, that is being crossed more and more frequently today. See
id. With inadequate laws on the books to curb the media, the actor and not the
photographer has sometimes wound up on the wrong side of the law. See Fiore,
supra note 12, at Al. The actor needs some recourse other than violence. See id.
17. For a discussion of some background on the Court's balancing of free
speech and privacy issues with respect to media conduct, see infra notes 28-68 and
accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the laws currently in place in the American legal sys-
tem for punishing the media for conduct that places an individual in fear of or at
risk of bodily harm, see infra notes 69-217 and accompanying text. This section
explores the scope and application of these laws to determine the extent to which
there are gaps in the protection they provide.
19. For a discussion of mechanisms currently in place in the American legal
system, see infra notes 218-91 and accompanying text. Section IV assesses both
whether current laws are sufficient and comprehensive enough to deter such con-
duct and what additional and alternative measures are worth considering. Section
IV also explores the extent to which the threat of punishment generally deters
conduct.
20. See infra, notes 291-327 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
22. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (state license
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In United States v. New York Times Co.,23 the Supreme Court
noted that the free flow of information and opinions to the public
is essential to a constitutional democracy and can only be guaran-
teed by "[a] vigorous press even a 'cantankerous press, an obstinate
press, [and] an ubiquitous press."' 24 Furthermore, democracy re-
quires that "[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open." 25 The right to publish or broadcast news
without prior restraint is at the core of the First Amendment.2 6 The
Supreme Court has frequently stated a heavy presumption against
constitutionality for statutes that constitute prior restraints on
speech. 27 Statutes that punish speech once spoken are not pre-
sumed to be unconstitutional, but are usually subjected to strict
scrutiny.2 8
Newsgathering is a critical part of a free press. 29 The ability to
gather news is, for obvious reasons, integral to the ability to report
23. 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en
banc), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (state seeking prior restraint on
publication of Vietnam study failed to meet heavy burden to justify imposition of
prior restraint).
24. Id. at 331.
25. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (open criticism of
important government conduct does not lose unconstitutional protections merely
because it is effective criticism and may diminish official reputations).
26. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413,
1417 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Grosjean, 297
U.S. at 249; CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994)); see also Thomas J. Goger,
Annotation, First Amendment as Immunizing Newsmen from Liability for Tortious Con-
duct While Gathering News, 28 ALR FED. 904 (1976). It should be noted, however,
that the First Amendment freedoms afforded broadcast speakers are more limited
than those afforded print media speakers. The Supreme Court has permitted
more extensive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media
due to the unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium and the scarcity of
frequencies upon which to broadcast speech. See Turner Broadcast Systems v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
27. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); see also Davis, 510 U.S. at 1315; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
561 (1976); Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
28. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42
(1978). When a state punishes publication after the event it must demonstrate
that punishment is necessary to further its interests. See id.; see also Smith, 443 U.S.
at 102.
29. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). "Without some protec-
tion for seeking news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id.; see also
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (stating that there is an "undoubted
right to gather news 'from any source by means within the law.'"). Focusing on
newsgathering conduct, thus, does not divorce this inquiry from the established
principles involving free speech-the public's right to know and the media's right
to publish. See generally Barnett, supra note 14, at 433 (defending use of subterfuge,
such as undercover, as valuable means in uncovering serious abuses and spurring
reform); see also Paul A. Lebel, Symposium: Undercover Newsgathering Techniques: Issues
[Vol. 6: p. 171
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the news.3 0 The right to publish or broadcast news does not, how-
ever, carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information. 31
While newsgathering is integral to a free press and to free speech,
both of which are broadly protected rights contained within the
First Amendment, the right to gather news is limited.32 There are
two reasons for this. First, the Supreme Court has held that only
speech and publication of information which is lawfully obtained
will be protected from tort liability.33 Accordingly, if information is
unlawfully obtained, neither the publication of the information nor
the gathering of the information is protected from liability by the
and Concerns, "The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Towards a First Amend-
ment Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering " 4 WM. & MARY L.J.
1145, 1152 (1996); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amend-
ment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1992).
30. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665; A.A. Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). "While newsgathering is an integral
part of news dissemination, hidden mechanical devices are not indispensable tools
of newsgathering .... Investigative reporting is an ancient art." Id. Cf Barnett,
supra note 13, at 433; Lebel, supra note 29, at 1154.
Some commentators feel that newsgathering should be afforded the same
First Amendment protection as that afforded to the publication of news. See, e.g.,
Lebel, supra note 29, at 1152.
A truly robust debate contemplates something richer than a purely for-
mal exchange of fixed positions. The notion of public debate anticipates
an openness to the consideration of new ideas and a willingness to ac-
commodate new information.... If the ideas and opinions in the public
debate are to compete for public acceptance, and if their strength de-
pends on the quality of the supporting evidence, then the process of ac-
quiring that evidence should be understood to share in the constitutional
attention at least to the extent that is given to speech that injures reputa-
tion and invades privacy.
Id.; see also Dyk, supra note 29, at 928.
31. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (holding that First Amend-
ment freedom of press affords media members no greater access to information
than is afforded average members of public). Some commentators believe that the
press should have greater access to information. See Dyk, supra note 29, at 929.
32. See Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987). "This
qualified right ... emanates from the strong public policy supporting the unfet-
tered communication of information by the journalist to the public." Id.
33. See Smith, 443 U.S. at 102-03 (noting that state action to punish publica-
tion of truthful, lawfully obtained information will seldom withstand constitutional
challenge under strict scrutiny); see also Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
469 (1975) (lawful acquisition of rape victim's name from public records prevents
tort liability for publication). Early Supreme Court cases support the notion that if
a "newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public signifi-
cance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the infor-
mation, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Id.; see also
Edwardo W. Gonzalez, "Get That Camera Out of My Face!" An Examination of the Via-
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First Amendment.a4 In addition, the Supreme Court has refused to
construe the First Amendment as immunizing media defendants
for violations of generally applicable criminal and civil laws.3 5 The
"lawfully obtained" requirement has been employed in conjunction
with the concept of generally applicable laws to hold the media ac-
countable for newsgathering conduct that violates generally appli-
cable civil and criminal laws.3 6
An extensive line of cases illustrates that the press is wholly sub-
ject to generally applicable laws. 37 These Supreme Court decisions
form the framework for analyzing claims of media newsgathering
conduct which places an individual in fear of or at risk of bodily
harm.38 One of the most famous of these decisions is Branzburg v.
Hayes.39 In Branzburg, a newsman refused to comply with a grand
jury subpoena on the ground that his First Amendment right to
gather and report news required that he be protected from testify-
ing and from being forced to disclose his confidential sources to a
grand jury.40 In ruling that the First Amendment does not protect
34. See Smith, 443 U.S. at 102-03; Cox, 420 U.S. at 496 (suggesting that im-
proper means of gathering information may vitiate First Amendment Protections
against tort liability); see also, Jeffrey Grossman, First Amendment Implications of Tort
Liability for News-Gathering, 1996 Ann. Survey of Amer. Law 583, 592 (1996).
35. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). "[G]enerally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforce-
ment against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." Id.; see also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937). A pub-
lisher has "no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others." Id.; see
also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1417 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
36. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669; Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1417 (noting that me-
dia defendant's violation of generally applicable law renders information gathered
.unlawfully" obtained and not protected). Smith supports the notion that the First
Amendment protects journalists' rights to use "routine newspaper reporting tech-
niques" to lawfully obtain information. See Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
37. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132 (First Amendment does not immunize
press from regulatory provisions enacted to protect employees in workplace); Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945) (First Amendment does not
immunize press from anti-trust provisions); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 193 (1946) (First Amendment does not immunize press from appli-
cation of Fair Labor Standards Act); Citizens Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131, 139 (1969) (First Amendment does not immunize press from anti-trust provi-
sions); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 665 (1972) (reporters have same obliga-
tion to testify before grand jury as do all other citizens); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977) (First Amendment does not immu-
nize press from appropriation of right to publicity when press broadcasts per-
former's entire act without performer's consent thus limiting performer's
customers); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 575 (1983) (First Amendment does not immunize press from eco-
nomic regulations such as use taxes on paper and inks); Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663.
38. See infra notes 69-217.
39. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665.
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a reporter who refuses to comply with a grand jury subpoena, the
Court held that the media is not immune from the application of
general laws regardless of whether a general law places an inciden-
tal burden on the press. 41 In other instances, the Court has held
that the press is subject to generally applicable laws such as copy-
right laws, 42 the National Labor Relations Act,43 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,44 antitrust regulations, 4 5 and non-discriminatory
taxes.
46
The most recent Supreme Court affirmation of the general ap-
plicability standard came in 1991 with the decision in Cohen v.
Cowles.47 The Cohen Court held that it is "beyond dispute" that the
press has no special immunity from the application of general
laws.48 Specifically, the Cohen Court ruled that where the press
makes and subsequently breaches an express promise of confidenti-
ality, the press could be subjected to the general laws governing
promissory estoppel.49 The Court noted that Minnesota's doctrine
of promissory estoppel "does not target or single out the press.
Rather, insofar as we are advised, the doctrine is generally applica-
ble to the daily transactions of all citizens of Minnesota. The First
Amendment does not forbid its application to the press."50
Where the existing generally applicable laws reach the news-
gathering conduct employed by a media defendant, the defendant
41. See id. The Supreme Court has consistently held that content-based regu-
lations must withstand strict scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Systems v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 622 (1994); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). Content-based regu-
lations suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech be-
cause of its content. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. Content-neutral regulations, even
if they have an incidental burden on First Amendment rights, need only withstand
intermediate scrutiny. See id.
42. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977).
43. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
44. See Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
45. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Citizens Publ'g
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
46. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
47. 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991). The Court reminded the media that generally
applicable laws are not offensive to the First Amendment simply because their en-
forcement against the press might have an incidental effect on its ability to gather
and report the news. See id. at 668. The Court noted that "the truthful informa-
tion sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired." Id. "The press may
not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news." Id.
48. See id. at 670.
49. See id.
50. Id. The Cohen Court found that the Minnesota promissory estoppel doc-
trine was a law of general applicability. See id. The Cohen Court also noted that
general laws need not withstand any stricter level of scrutiny when applied to the
press than when applied to other persons or organizations. See id.
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may face liability.51 Recently, an increasing amount of newsgather-
ing conduct has been challenged as unlawful. 52 There are also an
increasing number of recent examples of newsgathering conduct
that has gone too far.53
While a responsible press is undoubtedly desirable, "press re-
sponsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated. ' 54 State and federal courts em-
ploying laws of general application, however, have begun demand-
ing press responsibility.55 This can be seen in cases which have held
51. See O'Neil, supra note 29, at 1013.
Newsgathering conduct does not absolve journalists from direct liability
for damages caused by aggressive pursuit of information. If a reporter
tramples a flower bed, breaks a window, or assaults a person in pursuit of
a story, no court in the country would entertain a First Amendment de-
fense to a suit for direct damages. Thejournalistic goal would, in fact, be
irrelevant to most such claims.
Id. Some commentators, however, believe that while it is permissible to subject the
press to generally applicable criminal laws, they should not be exposed to civil
liability unless the subject matter was not a legitimate public concern. See Stem,
supra note 13, at 130-31.
52. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 937. While tabloid television shows are a
relatively recent phenomenon, concerns about an over-intrusive press have en-
veloped legal debate for over a century. See id. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis declared that "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency." Id. Warren and Brandeis concluded that
the law is to protect "the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device
for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds." Id.; see also Ricker, supra note 13,
at 25. The discussion of media accountability has also focused on "today's ad-
vanced electronic gadgetry that enables paparazzi to snatch images of celebrities'
private moments from farther and farther away." Id. "The law is lagging behind
the technology. But no matter how much technology has changed since 1789, the
First Amendment hasn't changed, and that's what our laws are based on." Id.
(quoting Kent Raygor, a partner with Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, a Los
Angeles entertainment and intellectual property law firm).
53. See Symposium: Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications, "Panel I: Ac-
countability of the Media in Investigations," 7 FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 401 (1997); see also Kurtz, Pictures at a High Price, supra note 2, at Al. National
Enquirer editor, Steve Coz, commented that some photographers are going too
far. See id. People are angry about the lying and hidden cameras "which is why a
North Carolina jury hit ABC... for secretly filming inside a Food Lion.... Folks
are mad about phony theatrics, which is why 'Dateline NBC' was forced to apolo-
gize for staging the fiery crash of a General Motors truck." Kurtz, Press to Public:
Just Play Fair, supra note 9, at B4. Recently, courts have found that the press has
gone too far in both its treatment of Maria Shriver and Arnold Schwarzenegger
and in its treatment of the Wolfson family in the Philadelphia area. For a further
discussion of cases in which courts have decided that the press has gone too far,
see infra notes 107-217 and accompanying text.
54. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding
that state cannot constitutionally force newspaper to publish that which it would
otherwise not publish).
55. See Sandra Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Expose Others to Risk of Bodily
Harm, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & Err. L.J. 225, 228 (1997).
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the media liable, making them pay for exposing others to the risk
of bodily harm.56 The increase in instances of newsgathering con-
duct that overstepped professional bounds is believed to be due, in
part, to technological advancements. 57 Recently, technological ad-
vancements in electronic surveillance have expanded the media's
ability to photograph, tape record, and disseminate information
and, consequently, have made it easier for news enterprises to in-
vade the sacred precincts of private life.58 But, while technology
has changed, the First Amendment remains the same. 59 Following
Princess Diana's death, several commentators urged that existing
generally applicable laws were insufficient to punish and prevent
conduct like that of the photographers present on the night that
Diana died, and thus, insisted that greater privacy protections were
required to prevent similar tragedies. 60 Other commentators as-
serted that the existing generally applicable laws were sufficient.61
56. See id. at 229.
57. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 937; see also Victor A. Kovner, Suzanne L.
Telsey, Giana M. McCarthy, Recent Developments in Newsgathering, Invasion of Privacy
and Related Torts, 460 PI/PAT 507, 517 (1996) (noting that advances in electronic
surveillance technology has limited application of some First Amendment defenses
to claims based on publication, and that aggressive conduct of electronic media
has led to increase in claims based on newsgathering). This may now form the
most serious threat to media defendants of any of the traditional privacy torts. See
id. This is not a new concern. Justices Warren and Brandeis lodged their concerns
over the effects that technological advancements would have on the right to pri-
vacy and the ability to invade others' privacy. See id.; see also Ricker, supra note 13,
at 25. The discussion of media accountability has also focused on "today's ad-
vanced electronic gadgetry that enables paparazzi to snatch images of celebrities'
private moments from farther and farther away." Id.
58. See id. In contrast, some commentators note that the media's increased
ability to gather news through investigative techniques has been instrumental in
exposing fraud, corruption, and illegal activity and in informing the public as to
this wrongdoing. See Barnett, supra note 13, at 434. For example, in one instance,
mere description of horrible conditions in a nursing home may not have had the
outrage-provoking effect as did the graphic footage which reporters acquired by
subterfuge, including hidden cameras. See id.
59. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 25. This argument is premised on the fact
that certain bodies of law like the tort of trespass, for example, still require anti-
quated elements such as a physical trespass-regardless of the degree to which the
electronic revolution affords one the ability to view places that could never before
be viewed without a physical trespass. See Statement of Dianne Feinstein, supra
note 13.
60. See Spiegelman, supra note 8; see also Ricker, supra note 13, at 25. This
position is based on the premise that, if the existing law provided a sufficient
threat of punishment, the threat would have deterred the conduct. See id.
61. See, e.g., Goodale and Feigelson, supra note 9, at 2, col. 4; Joyce, supra note
9, at 36; O'Neil, supra note 9, at A23, col. 1; Paparazzi Overreaction, supra note 9, at
A6.
Speaking directly about the Princess Diana tragedy, commentators noted that
laws prohibiting trespassing, harassment, and stalking along with laws against tail-
gating and aggressive driving are already on the books. Paparazzi Overreaction,
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In light of these assertions, the following discussion considers
whether the generally applicable privacy laws currently in effect are
sufficient to punish the media for newsgathering conduct that
places individuals in fear or at risk of bodily harm.
III. PUNISHING DANGEROUS CONDUCT
This section discusses some of the causes of action available for
punishing media conduct which places an individual in fear or at
risk of bodily harm in order to determine whether the existing laws
of general applicability are sufficient to punish such conduct.
A. Imposing Liability
Where newsgathering conduct has placed an individual in fear
or at risk of bodily harm, a media defendant may be subject to a
variety of tort and criminal claims. 62 A plaintiff might assert such
torts as intrusion, assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligence
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 63 Similarly, the state
might pursue criminal charges such as harassment, criminal tres-
pass, stalking, disorderly conduct, and reckless endangerment. 64
supra note 9, at A6. Were these laws to actually be enforced, the argument contin-
ues, they could effectively keep packs of photographers at bay. See id.; see also
Goodale and Feigelson, supra note 9, at 2. They claim that "[w]orldwide, it is well
settled that newsgathering needs do not excuse media lawbreaking. A journalist
who stalks, speeds or assaults should be punished, and can be punished without
new legislation." Id.; see alsoJonathan B. Becker, The First Amendment Goes Tactical:
News Media Negligence and Ongoing Criminal Incidents, 15 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 626, 648
(1995). "The imposition of liability for torts committed during newsgathering is
nothing more than a law of general applicability that clearly falls outside the scope
of First Amendment protection." Id.
62. See Thomas J. Goger, First Amendment as Immunizing Newman from Liability
for Tortious Conduct While Gathering News, Annotation, 28 ALR Fed. 904 (1976). The
First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal or to intrude by electronic
means into the precincts of another's home or office. See A.A. Deitemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). "[C]rimes and torts committed in news gather-
ing are not constitutionally protected" and there can be no "threat to free press in
requiring its agents to act within the law." Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1973).
63. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Risenhoover
v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996); A.A. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 245;
Galella, 487 F.2d at 986.
64. See, e.g., Goger, supra note 62 (discussing numerous claims that could be
brought against reporters). These lists, however, are by no means exhaustive, espe-
cially in light of the creative lawyering efforts now being employed in actions alleg-
ing media misconduct. See Thomas S. Leatherbury, Media Law: Explosion of Lanham
Act Cases, 14 SPG CoMM. LAw. 1 (1996). There are numerous possibilities and
potential causes of action that could be asserted. Publication related claims
"designed to circumvent the constitutional strictures of defamation" have been in-
creasingly viewed as disguised libel claims. See id. Consequently, plaintiffs' attor-
neys have begun to "tweak their pleadings to include claims based on how the
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is little case law wherein some
of these causes of action have, in fact, been employed against media
defendants. Existing cases support the argument that no further
laws are needed to hold the media accountable for this specific con-
duct.65 Yet, while such laws regarding media defendants exist,
there are gaps in the protection they provide. 66 These gaps are evi-
dent in the ways that courts have construed and applied existing
laws. 67 Because of these differing interpretations and applications,
some claims are likely to fail.68
1. The Right to Privacy
Some commentators urge that increased privacy protection is
essential to prevent future tragedies like Princess Diana's death. 69
More precisely, some commentators assert that privacy torts repre-
sent an ideal cause of action for plaintiffs to invoke against tabloid
media defendants. 70 In light of these assertions, this Comment ana-
lyzes the privacy protections currently in place in the United States.
There are two notions of the Right of Privacy. 71 One is the
privacy right that has been construed as emanating from the Bill of
information is gathered." Id. Claims based on newsgathering activity have a
higher profile than ever before. See id. Mr. Leatherbury has noted that the newest
"end-run around the libel laws shifts the focus back to content, as a growing
number of plaintiffs seek to extend the reach of the Lanham Act, demanding both
damages for and injunctions against the use of registered or unregistered trade-
marks in newstories... ." Id.; see also Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 511 (noting
creative lawyering efforts as possible end-runs around strict torts laws of defama-
tion); Stem, supra note 13, at 116; see also Symposium: Current Issues in Media and
Telecommunications, "Panel I: Accountability of the Media in Investigations, "7 FoRDHAM
INrrELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 401 (1997). In Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC
Inc., where ABC sent undercover reporters to work at a Food Lion Grocery Store
and then broadcast a story including unauthorized footage of food mishandling,
Food Lion did not allege defamation, the more obvious or likely claim. See Food
Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Instead, Food
Lion alleged violations of fourteen various state and federal laws stemming from
ABC's newsgathering activities. See Stem, supra note 13, at 117.
65. For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 75-187 and accom-
panying text.
66. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 997. For a further discussion of the gaps in
coverage of these laws, see infra notes 188-217 and accompanying text.
67. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 997.
68. See id.
69. See Senate Bill 2103, Purpose and Findings.
70. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 941. This is because the privacy torts "in
their original formulation centered on the notion that an individual's privacy war-
ranted some form of lawful protection against the actions of an over-intrusive
press." Id. (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890)).
71. See Dennis F. Hemandez, Litigating the Right to Privacy: A Survey of Current
Issues, 446 PLI/Pat 425, 430 (June 20-21, 1996). Both of these notions have
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Rights, a limitation on the government's ability to intrude upon cer-
tain zones of privacy.72 The other is the common law privacy tort
developed in the 1890s involving the personal right to be left
alone.73 Because the media is not an official branch of govern-
ment, only the common law privacy tort is related to the issue of
media accountability.7 4
The common law privacy tort can be traced to a law review
article written in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Bran-
deis. 75 These authors reported a trend in the law wherein courts
were extending tort protection beyond property rights to privacy
rights, which they described as "inviolate personality."76 Warren
and Brandeis asserted that the right to be left alone, as impliedly
recognized by the courts in the surveyed decisions, should be ex-
pressly recognized as an independent tort.77 Warren and Brandeis
noted the increasing need for privacy protection in the wake of the
Industrial Revolution and all the technological advancements it
brought with it.78
evolved over the last century. See id. at 425 (noting that prior to 1890, no English
or American court had ever granted relief based expressly upon invasion of
privacy).
72. See Hernandez, supra note 71, at 430-31. In cases such as Griswold v. Con-
necticut, the Supreme Court recognized zones of privacy constitutionally encom-
passed in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Bill of
Rights. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
73. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890). Some scholars report that the most common views of what the
right to privacy entails are "1) the right to be left alone, 2) the right to exercise
autonomy or control over significant personal matters and 3) the right to limit
access to the self." See id.
74. Absent state action, constitutional protection is unavailable. See, e.g., Her-
nandez, supra note 72, at 430.
75. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 937. "Concerns about an over-intrusive
press, however, have enveloped legal debate for over a century." Id. Justices War-
ren and Brandeis declared that "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency." Id. (citing Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HLv. L. REv. 193 (1890)).
76. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 73, at 193; see also McClurg, supra note 13,
at 997. Upon surveying decisions in numerous areas of law, such as defamation,
breach of confidentiality, and breach of implied contract, the authors concluded
that the decisions represented a recognition of a right to privacy. See id. at 997; see
also Hernandez, supra note 72, at 435-37. Justices Brandeis and Warren wrote of
the right to determine the extent to which a "person's thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others." Id. This seminal article noted that
the trend in the common law was a recognition of a "'quiet zone' in each person's
life that is immune from the prying of neighbors, the press and the public." Mar-
tin P. Hoffman, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, SB77 ALi-ABA 227, 229 (1997).
77. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 997.
78. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 429.
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In 1960, Professor Prosser divided the right of privacy into four
distinct categories based on the different types of interferences with
the rights of the individual.79 According to Prosser, courts were im-
posing tort liability where a defendant intruded into private mat-
ters,80 disclosed private facts,8 1 published claims that placed a
plaintiff in a false light,82 and misappropriated a person's name or
likeness. 83 Prosser's four prongs of the right of privacy have been
generally accepted by the courts and were even incorporated into
both the Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1977 and several states'
statutes.84 While the fundamental aspects of these torts have been
widely accepted, courts appear to differ in their interpretation and
application. 85
79. See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 230; see also Hernandez, supra note 72, at
435-36. To the extent there is a common denominator among the four Prosser
prongs, it appears to be the improper interference, by means of observation or
communication, with the personal and private spheres, as consigned by strong and
widely shared social norms. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 436.
80. See id. at 435-36. "[I] nvasion of privacy by intrusion... may be physical in
nature, or may be an intrusion into one's private affairs; examples are police enter-
ing one's home to search same without a warrant; 'peeping toms' or stalkers; eaves-
droppers; relentless pestering by bill collectors ... " Hoffman, supra note 76, at
230.
81. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 453. "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public." Id. Newsworthi-
ness is a defense to this tort. A logical nexus should exist between the private facts
disclosed, e.g. in rape cases, to what is newsworthy. The extent of the newsworthi-
ness defense is not unlimited. "The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to
be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, § 652D.
82. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 435-36. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines the false light tort as follows:
[o] ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of privacy if (1) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publi-
cized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652E. A number of states do not allow this
cause of action-it is highly controversial and rarely well defined. See Hernandez,
supra note 72, at 435-36.
83. See id. One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or like-
ness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. See id.
at 471.
84. See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 231. For a further discussion of how courts
differ in their interpretation and application of the tort of intrusion, see infra notes
188-217 and accompanying text.
85. Some commentators argue that some of these torts have been interpreted
into oblivion. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 1002. McClurg writes that after the
Supreme Court decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the tort of public disclosure of
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Intrusion, the first of Prosser's four prongs, directly addresses
newsgathering conduct.8 6 The other three causes of action require
some form of publication.8 7 Consequently, this Comment discusses
only the intrusion prong of the privacy tort.88 Since a cause of ac-
tion for intrusion can be brought regardless of publication, this is
"probably the most problematic area of privacy law for the me-
dia."89 Recently, the intrusion tort has been asserted more fre-
quently.90 This is a result of the increasing use of hidden cameras
by the broadcast media.91 Intrusion claims have accompanied
claims of trespass, fraud, RICO and others in recent creative lawyer-
ing efforts. 92 The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability
for intrusion on "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns,... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person."93 Broad as this seems, courts have applied
this Restatement definition narrowly.9 4 For example, both the Re-
private facts "is for most practical purposes dead.... The test the Court adopted
in Florida Star for when a state may constitutionally punish the publication of true
speech is so stringent that Justice White, writing in dissent, argued that the Court
had "'obliterate [d ] ' the tort of public disclosure of private facts." Id. at 1002 (dis-
cussing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)).
86. See Stern, supra note 13, at 133. The intrusion prong of the privacy tort
evolved from the common law trespass tort. See Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at
549. Trespass and intrusion claims are similar and are usually brought simultane-
ously. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 441. A claim of trespass "can usually be
found to accompany intrusion claims." Id. While the intrusion tort is derived from
the trespass tort, in an intrusion claim there need not be a physical trespass but the
intrusion must be highly offensive. See id at 441.
87. See Stern, supra note 13, at 135-36. False light and appropriation, do not
directly pertain to the balancing question of First Amendment protection at the
newsgathering stage. See id. "False light is strictly a harm to reputation, based on
publication. Appropriation... [is] also publication-triggered." Id.
88. In fact, commentators note that the assertion of all different forms of in-
trusion claims has increased in recent years. See, e.g., Kovner, et al., supra note 57,
at 511.
89. Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 511. This is primarily because the consti-
tutional protection of free press focuses on publication, notwithstanding the fact
that newsgathering is a necessary aspect of a free press.
90. See id. at 511.
91. See id.
92. See Kovner, et al., supa note 57, at 511.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B.
94. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 1055; see also Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at
511. The Restatement and most courts preclude liability, however, where the de-
fendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff consented to the defendant's conduct.
See id. Consent can be express or implied. See id. Consent is the most effective
defense to a claim of intrusion. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 435-36.
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statement and case law expressly limit application of this claim of
intrusion upon private places.95
There are three general categories of intrusion claims: 1) me-
dia defendant intruded by surreptitious surveillance of plaintiff;96
2) media defendant engaged in a traditional trespass which also
amounted to a highly offensive intrusion upon plaintiffs solitude
or seclusion;97 or 3) media defendant was given express or implied
95. See generally McClurg, supra note 13.
96. See Hernandez, supra note 72, at 435-36. Examples of surreptitious surveil-
lance claims include "peeking into windows, electronically recording conversations
without consent of all parties and unauthorized reproduction of private docu-
ments." Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 517. See, e.g., A.A. Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Cassidy v. ABC, 60 Ill. App. 3d 831 (1st Div.
1978); see also Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). In
Desnick, an investigative TV news program sent "undercover" patients accompanied
by "friends" who concealed cameras and taped the examination of the undercover
patient. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348. The district court dismissed the claims of
trespass, common law intrusion, state promissory fraud and federal wiretapping.
See id. at 1347. The Seventh Circuit expressly distinguished Desnick's claims
against ABC as two distinct types of claims. See id. at 1355. The first type arose
from the broadcast and the second type arose from the newsgathering, the means
by which ABC obtained the information. See id. Because the doctor consented,
even though consent was fraudulently induced, the trespass claim had to fall. See
id. at 1352. The intrusion claims were also dismissed because the conversations
recorded were between the fake patients and the doctors and no personal facts
were elicited. See id. at 1353; see also Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
Some intrusion and surreptitious surveillance claims have been brought in
concert with claims based on federal wire-tapping prohibitions. See Kovner, et al.,
supra note 57, at 559-60. The Federal Wiretap Statute, prohibits the interception
and disclosure of "any wire or oral communication" except where the interceptor
and divulger are participants to the communication. See Federal Wiretap Statute,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20. This exception may preclude many claims against under-
cover investigative newsgatherers. There is, however, an exemption to this excep-
tion where the participant's conduct was for the "purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." Id. at 560
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)). In cases where the media defendant is protected
by the statute's exception, state laws may fill the gaps. See Kovner, et al., supra note
57, at 567 (noting at least 10 states where recording communication is not lawful
merely because reporter recording communication is participant). For example,
in Dickerson v. Raphael, the Michigan eavesdropping statute, a generally applica-
ble law, made the information a media defendant published to be unlawfully ob-
tained and thus actionable. See Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Mich.
App. 1997).
97. See Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 570. A traditional trespass occurs
where the defendant intentionally enters upon the plaintiffs property. See Steven
Perry, Hidden Cameras, New Technology, and the Law, 14-FALL COMM. LAw. 1, 20-21
(1996). The greatest obstacle to trespass claims, regardless of whether they
amount to an intrusion, is that consent to the trespass is an absolute defense. See
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Consent can be ex-
press or implied, it need not be knowing or intended, and it may have legal effect
even where it is procured by fraud. See id. at 756-57.
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consent to "intrude" but exceeded the scope of that consent.98
Conduct falling into one of these three categories may expose the
media to liability.99
In Wolfson v. Lewis, 100 technological advancements aided jour-
nalists at the television tabloid news show, Inside Edition, to engage
in the first two of the previously described types of intrusion. These
journalists staged an intense and wide-ranging surveillance of the
Wolfson family.10' Upon being denied an interview, the journalists
began surveying and monitoring the family's every move. 10 2 De-
spite pleas from the family to be left alone, the journalists
persisted. 103
98. See Perry, supra note 97, at 20-21. "Whether the scope of the consent is
exceeded will depend on a number of factors. If the plaintiff consented to taping,
even if the defendant misrepresented the purpose of the taping, there should be
no liability." Id. This includes instances where consent to enter into a private set-
ting for a specified purpose has been exceeded, as where a reporter gains access to
information through false pretenses. See Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 549. In
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., defendant specifically told plaintiff, the victim of domestic vio-
lence at the hands of her husband, that it was videotaping plaintiffs interview by a
victim specialist for the District Attorney's office. See Baugh, 828 F. Supp. 745 at
756. Because plaintiff consented to the video crew's presence and videotaping,
her claim for trespass and intrusion failed. See id.
99. See infra notes 106-28 for a further discussion of cases involving intrusion
claims.
100. 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
101. See Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 511. "Based upon the intensity and
variety of surveillance alone, Wolfson v. Lewis, provides the most challenging de-
velopment in the law of intrusion." Id. (citing Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1413). Jour-
nalists from Inside Edition were investigating high executive salaries at U.S.
Healthcare. See Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1415. The journalists sought interviews
and film footage of plaintiffs, Richard Wolfson, a senior executive at U.S. Health-
care, and his wife Nancy Wolfson also an executive and the daughter of Leonard
Abramson, chairman of the board and principal executive officer. See id. Inside
Edition is a "syndicated daily television news program." Id.
102. See id. at 1416. The journalists drove along side the Wolfson's cars
photographing the Wolfsons and recording their conversations with shotgun
mikes (microphones which are capable of recording conversations and sounds at a
distance of about sixty yards). See id. at 1423-31. The journalists followed every
member of the Wolfson family, including the children, vowing not to stop until the
requested interviews were granted. See id. Unbeknownst to the journalists and for
unrelated reasons, the family had previously received death threats and the initial
stress from the journalists' surveillance was immense. See id. Once the family
learned the identity of those following them they were somewhat relieved but no
less uncomfortable. See id. They begged the journalists to stop. See id.
103. See id. at 1435. The journalists asserted that their conduct was lawful,
declined to stop, and continued to press for an interview promising that they
would not relent until the interview was granted. See id. at 1423-31. Thejournalists
even followed the family from Pennsylvania to Florida for their family vacation. See
id. While in Florida, the journalists continued their surveillance from boats
outside the family home, employing their shotgun mikes and other technology in
an effort to catch anything they could. See id.
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The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania granted the Wolfsons a preliminary injunction.104 Finding
that the purpose of the harassing efforts was to get the family to
grant the interview, and not a more legitimate purpose such as try-
ing to get background material for a story, the conduct was held
not to be "routine newsgathering."10 5 First Amendment protection,
the court held, is limited in that it protects the "right of journalists
to lawfully obtain information using 'routine newspaper reporting
techniques."'1 06 The court concluded that the techniques em-
ployed by these journalists were neither lawful nor routine. 10 7
In Shulman v. Group WProductions, Inc.,10 8 the court held that
the media's videotaping at the scene of plaintiffs car accident was
not an intrusion because the site could be observed by anyone and
because the traumatic accident was newsworthy.' 0 9 The California
Supreme Court held that the lower courts improperly granted sum-
mary judgment because they should have allowed a jury to deter-
mine whether a reasonable person would have found highly
104. See id. at 1422.
In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court must
consider (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at
trial (2) the extent to which plaintiffs will sufifer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued, and (4) the pub-
lic interest.
Id. The court found that all four of these factors were met with respect to the
intrusion claims. See id. The court could not grant the injunction with respect to
the trespass claim relating to the photographs taken from the edge of the plain-
tiffs' driveway because the state law was unclear as to whether trespass law allowed
such a claim. See id. at 1423-31. The court granted the preliminary injunction
upon finding that plaintiffs had established a reasonable likelihood of succeeding
on their intrusion claim. See id.
105. Id. Furthermore, the court held that the journalists' use of the shotgun
mikes was actionable but use of cameras placed on the roadway outside the plain-
tiff's house was not. See id.
106. Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1417 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
107. See id. The Wolfson court relied on Galella v. Onassis and A.A.
Dietemann v. Time in reaching this conclusion. This part of the decision was
wholly unprecedented. See id. A defense expert testified that the journalists activi-
ties "were consistent with journalistic standards, and that 'stakeouts' of subjects
homes and photographs of subjects in public places without their knowledge was
'completely routine newsgathering.'" Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 515. In fact,
it should be noted that much of the journalists' conduct in the Wolfson case is not
unusual; however, much of it was "outrageous and troubling." Id.
108. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (June 1, 1998).
109. Id. at 862 (June 1, 1998). The California Supreme Court noted that the
accident scene was not visible from the road thus making it even less likely that the
accident could really have been observed by anyone on the road and buttressing
the argument that those on the road were unlikely to have been able to hear plain-
tiffs conversations with her rescuers. See id. at 864.
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offensive the media's presence, tape recording and videotaping of
the activities in the rescue helicopter.110 The court believed that a
jury could well have found that the media's presence and conduct
in the helicopter as well as the media's tape recording of the vic-
tim's conversations with the rescue team during on the scene treat-
ment was highly offensive and possibly an intrusion. Accordingly,
those issues were remanded for trial. 1
In Miller v. NBC,1 1 2 the California Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond District found NBC liable for trespass and intrusion.113 In
Miller, an NBC television camera crew entered the Miller home
without consent to film paramedics who had been called to try to
save Mr. Miller's life. 114 NBC then broadcast the footage of Mr.
Miller's fatal heart attack without Mrs. Miller's consent.1 15 Finding
that NBC had not been given consent to enter the premises and
that a reasonable person could find NBC's conduct "highly offen-
sive," the court determined that Mrs. Miller had successfully stated
a cause of action that could go to a jury for factual determina-
tions.1 16
In A.A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,'1 7 reporters from Life magazine
used subterfuge to enter the office portion of Dietemann's house
and, without consent, proceeded to photograph, record and trans-
mit his conversations with other people. 118 The reporters were
found liable for trespass and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.119 The Ninth Circuit warned that the First Amendment has
"never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or
110. See id. at 868.
111. See id. at 871-72.
112. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986).
113. See id. at 677-79. Here the defendants engaged in the second kind of
intrusion, the trespass that also amounts to a highly offensive intrusion upon the
seclusion and solitude of an individual.
114. See id. at 670.
115. See id. In fact, NBC broadcast the footage without consent and without
giving notice to the family the first time and then re-broadcast the footage after an
express request that it not be broadcast. See id.
116. See id. at 679. Mrs. Miller also prevailed on her claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. For a further discussion of this claim, see infra notes
173-87 and accompanying text.
117. 49 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
118. See id.; see also Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 939. Here the media defend-
ants engaged in the first and third kind of intrusions, surreptitious surveillance
and exceeding consent.
119. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. Commentators have noted that while the
Ninth Circuit held the newsgathering conduct in Dietemann to be an intrusion, it
did not provide an adequate conceptual framework for what newsgathering con-
duct will and will not subject the newsgatherer to tort liability. See Garnett, supra
note 13, at 443. Accordingly, "the investigative reporter attempting to determine
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crimes committed during the course of newsgathering."120 Further-
more, the court advised that "[t] he First Amendment does not be-
come a license to trespass, steal or intrude into the precincts of
another's home or office simply because the person subjected to
the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing a crime." 121
2. Stalking and Disorderly Conduct
Stalking and disorderly conduct are two criminal sanctions that
states can pursue against media defendants.1 22 Stalking was not a
crime until California prohibited it in a 1992 statute.1 23 Stalking
legislation evolved out of an inability of existing legislative remedies
to protect victims from their stalkers. 124 The elements of stalking
legislation vary among the states.1 25 Typical statutes require inten-
tional, willful or knowing intent to put the victim in reasonable fear
of bodily harm or death, coupled with the act of harassing or fol-
lowing.126 As most statutes require an intent to harm, and most
whether to go undercover... must do so at the peril of possible tort liability." Id.
at 441.
120. Id.
121. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. The court was convinced that Californians
would approve of the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy to instances of
intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which an ordinary
man in plaintiffs position could reasonably expect that the particular defendant
should be excluded. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 940.
122. See, e.g., Goodale and Feigelson, supra note 9, at 2; Paparazzi Overreaction,
supra note 9, at A6. While many commentators responding to Princess Diana's
fatal accident included stalking among the generally applicable laws already in ef-
fect to punish such newsgathering conduct, no cases were found wherein a media
defendant had been charged with stalking.
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992); see also Suzanne L. Karbarz,
The First Amendment Implications of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 21 J. Legis. 333, 335 (1995).
124. See id.
125. See Karbarz, supra note 123, at 336. For example, state statutes differ with
respect to the degree of intent required for conviction. See id. Some states have
broad proscriptions whereas others are very specific. See id.
126. See id. at 336-37. Some commentators assert that anti-stalking provisions
are ideally suited to combat newsgathering conduct that places the individual in
fear or at risk of bodily harm. SeeJoyce, supra note 9, at 36. "Media lawyers ... say
threats posed by aggressive photographers can be addressed by anti-stalking stat-
utes, in effect in all 50 states. Laws prohibiting trespass and assault also can be
used." Id. Commentators have noted, however, that courts are applying anti-stalk-
ing laws without fear of chilling expressive conduct. See Karbarz, supra note 123, at
333.
Anti-Stalking statutes were enacted to protect men and women from
harassing, threatening activity. The activity being proscribed by the stat-
utes transcends mere expressive conduct. Stalkers place their victims in
fear of them. This type of activity is not worthy of constitutional protec-
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members of the media engage in conduct with an intent to profit
rather than to harm, stalking laws may not provide sufficient cover-
age or prove a viable remedy in the media context.
Several states have convicted reporters for disorderly conduct
for actions undertaken in the course of newsgathering.1 27 Disor-
derly conduct is not only subject to a generally applicable criminal
statute; the same conduct can be the basis of civil liability for vari-
ous tort claims.1 28
3. Assault, Battery and Harassment
Generally, a civil battery is an intentional harmful or offensive
contact, and a civil assault is the placing of another in reasonable
apprehension of a battery.129 Actual physical harm is not a neces-
sary element of either tort.130 Ifa reasonable person would find the
contact offensive, the contact will be offensive under either tort.131
To prevail on an assault claim, the plaintiff must be placed in rea-
sonable fear of an imminent battery. 132 Unlike the law concerning
assault and battery, which is well established, the law of harassment
is not always well defined in case law or in statutes.1 33
In Galella v. Onassis,134 former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis was sued by a reporter against whom she had obtained a
restraining order.135 The reporter asserted that Mrs. Onassis' re-
127. See, e.g., City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 285 (Wis. 1989)
(denying newsgatherer access to airplane crash site did not violate First Amend-
ment but newsgathering conduct did constitute disorderly conduct and warrant
conviction); State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83, 83 (N.J. Super. 1987) (reporter imper-
sonation of public official to gain information from homicide victim's mother con-
stituted disorderly conduct and lead to conviction); State v. Lashinsky, 404 A.2d
1121, 1121 (N.J. 1979) (press photographer's refusal to heed police order to clear
accident scene for ambulance and other emergency access constituted violation of
state disorderly conduct statute).
128. For example, the reporter's conduct in State v. Lashinsky is virtually
identical to the conduct commentators warn can constitute negligence and subject
newsgatherers to civil liability. See Becker, supra note 14, at 625-26. For a further
discussion of negligence, see infra notes 157-72 and accompanying text.
129. See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter Galella I]).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. Threats of future harm are not sufficient for a claim to stand.
133. See Feinstein, supra note 13. Similar complaints are lodged against reck-
less endangerment and stalking prohibitions. See id. The reckless endangerment
statutes are applied inconsistently at best. See id. Anti-stalking ordinances do not
usually apply to activities undertaken for commercial purposes or require proof of
criminal intent to cause fear. See id.
134. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973).
135. See id. at 199.
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fusal to allow him to photograph her impeded his First Amend-
ment right to gather news.' 36 Mrs. Onassis cross-complained,
alleging outrageous newsgathering conduct, including claims of as-
sault and battery and harassment13 7 The court concluded that the
First Amendment "does not immunize all conduct designed to
gather information about or photographs of a public figure....
[T] here is no constitutional right to assault, harass, or unceasingly
shadow or distress public figures."1 38 On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed, concluding that "[c]rimes and torts committed in
news gathering are not protected" and that " [t]here is no threat to
a free press in requiring its agents to act within the law." 13 9
Galella's persistent threats to Mrs. Onassis, including 'Jumping
from concealed locations, following her at close distances at high
speeds and otherwise carrying out the paparazzi attack, consti-
tute[d] civil assault."' 40 Where his conduct amounted to an offen-
sive contact, Galella had committed a battery.' 4 ' Although this is
one of the few cases in which individuals have successfully alleged
assault and battery claims against media defendants, courts and
commentators have repeatedly affirmed that a member of the me-
dia cannot avoid liability for assault or battery by presenting a new-
sgathering defense.' 42
136. See id. at 220. The court sought to assess whether the First Amendment
rights to photograph and gather news would be infringed by injunctive relief. See
id. Galella asserted that the First Amendment provided him with a complete de-
fense to the counterclaim and intervenor complaint. See id. The court rejected
this contention because the First Amendment does not give the press the liberty to
engage in any sort of conduct, no matter how offensive, in order to gather news.
See id. at 220.
137. See Galela, 353 F. Supp. at 199.
138. Id. at 223.
139. Ga/e/a 1, 487 F.2d at 995-96.
140. Id.
141. See Galel/a, 353 F. Supp. at 226. Galella's conduct included flicking Onas-
sis with a camera strap, bumping her, and brushing up against her. See id.
142. In California v. Harrison and O'Brien, one photographer pushed aside a
person who tried to help the photographer's subject. See Court TV Verdicts, infra
note 146; See also O'Neil, Tainted Sources, supra note 51, at 1013.
Newsgathering conduct does not absolve journalists from direct liability
for damages caused by aggressive pursuit of information. If a reporter
tramples a flower bed, breaks a window, or assaults a person in pursuit of
a story, no court in the country would entertain a First Amendment de-
fense to a suit for direct damages. The journalistic goal would, in fact, be
irrelevant to most such claims.
Id. Where a reporter commits an assault or battery to acquire information, it does
not impede the ability of the First Amendment to hold the media liable for the
injuries. See id. The newspaper or television station may still be able to use the
story, but will likely be held accountable for the crimes committed. See id.
Some commentators imply that Galella is settled law that has been on the
books, undisturbed for twenty-five years. See Goodale and Feigelson, supra note 9,
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4. False Imprisonment
Where the media's conduct physically restrains the person
against her will and without lawful justification, the media may be
found liable for false imprisonment.143 Such conduct can be the
basis of both criminal and civil liability.
In May 1997, Arnold Schwarzenegger and his wife Maria
Shriver were run off the road by photographers who surrounded
the couple's car.144 Mr. Schwarzenegger had recently undergone
heart surgery, Ms. Shriver was five months pregnant and their
young son was in the car.145 In February 1998, the photographers
were convicted of false imprisonment, reckless driving and
battery.146
In Delan v. CBS, Inc., 147 a mental patient sued CBS alleging
false imprisonment because a CBS reporter filmed the patient in a
mental institution. 148 Although the civil claim in Delan failed be-
cause the patient could not establish that he was restrained by CBS,
a plaintiff who can establish the elements of false imprisonment
may succeed in bringing such a cause of action.1 49
5. Negligence
The tort of negligence includes the following four elements:
(1) the defendant must have a duty to use reasonable care with
at 2. Galella essentially held that the rule "that a photographer has no more right
than anyone else to physically menace a subject, has been on the books for many
years without unduly disturbing the work of either mainstream or tabloid journal-
ists." Id. Perhaps one of the reasons there are not more cases reported that decide
whether liability for assault and battery can be imposed upon the media is because
the lines, in Ga/el/a, are clearly drawn. See id.
143. See Court TV Verdicts, infra note 146. Threats of future restraint are gener-
ally not actionable.
144. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 27.
145. See id. "While the incident ended without physical harm, it was an eerie
precursor to the Diana tragedy months later." Ricker, supra note 13, at 27.
146. See Court TV Verdicts, "California v. Harrison and O'Brien: 'The Arnold
Schwarzenegger Paparazzi Trial,'" http://www.courttv.com/verdicts/paparazzi.htmL
Giles Harrison was charged with reckless driving and two counts of false imprison-
ment. See id. Andrew O'Brien was charged with four counts of false imprisonment
(because he had boxed the couple in twice that day) and battery for shoving aside
people who tried to help the couple. See id.; see also Robert W. Welkos, Two Photog-
raphers Sentenced toJail:Judge Says Their Conduct in Pursuing Actor Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger and Wife Maria Shriver was "Morally Wrong" L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at B3.
O'Brien was sentenced to 90 days in jail, while Harrison was sentenced to 60 days.
See id. Both were fined $500 and placed on "informal" probation for two years. See
id.
147. 445 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1981).
148. See id at 900-01.
149. See id. at 903.
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respect to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must breach that duty;
(3) the defendant's breach of that duty to use reasonable care must
be the proximate and actual cause of plaintiffs injury; and (4) the
plaintiff must suffer actual damages from the injury. 150 The cases
in which negligence has been alleged have focused on the extent to
which newsgathering conduct of the media is unreasonable in light
of the foreseeable risks involved.' 51
"'Foreseeability' has consistently referred to what a 'reasonably
prudent person' would 'reasonably' foresee under similar circum-
stances."' 52 While parties regularly dispute foreseeability, courts
have begun to impose liability on members of the media found to
engage in behavior in which a reasonably prudent person would
not engage because of the foreseeability that harm would result. 153
Some courts have been willing to impose liability on the media
for the foreseeable consequences of newsgathering activities which
interfere with law enforcement efforts.' 54 Such impositions of lia-
bility indicate that courts are responding to the media's ever-in-
creasing technological ability to report stories as they happen. 155
150. See generalyJohn W. Wade, Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, and David
F. Partlett, PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ's TORTS 131 (9th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
PROSSER, WADE, AND ScHWtARTz]; see also Becker, supra note 14, at 634.
151. See, e.g., Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996). For
a further discussion of cases involving negligence claims, see infra notes 157-72.
152. Davidson, supra note 55, at 231.
153. See id. at 235-37. Courts that have dealt with claims that media negli-
gence has caused physical harm have been cautious in determining what com-
prises a foreseeable result of newsgathering conduct. See id. For example, the
court could not find foreseeable harm when one guest murdered another guest 12
days after their joint appearance on the Jenny Jones television show. See id. The
court stated that irrational or outrageous behavior on the part of a talk show guest
fails to evoke media liability absent specific circumstances making such behavior
foreseeable. See id.
154. See Risenhoover, 936 F. Supp. at 404-11; see also Becker, supra note 14, at
626 (discussing incidents where media have interfered with law enforcement ef-
forts and have been held liable). In 1987, a San Diego news team interfered with a
police department attempt to catch a fleeing criminal. See id. at 625-26. When an
officer realized that a reporter was dangerously situated right in the line of fire, he
withdrew his weapon and was shot by the escaping suspect. See id. Similar conduct
in New Jersey subjected a reporter to criminal liability for disorderly conduct. See
State v. Lashinsky, 404 A.2d 1121, 1121 (N.J. 1979), For a further discussion of
disorderly conduct charges, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
155. See Becker, supra note 15, at 627-28.
With the advent of new technologies such as satellite uplinks and remote
camera crews, television has displaced newspapers and radio as the pre-
dominant news medium. This shift has enabled the media to bring sto-
ries to the public as they happen rather than reporting them the next
day. By sending out a remote camera crew, the news media is able to
report breaking stories live, allowing the public to see first-hand every-
thing from terrorist attacks to natural disasters.
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Increased media efforts to report "live and late-breaking news" have
clearly resulted in increased carelessness and occasional negli-
gence.1 56 There is often less time for the media to assess safety is-
sues involved when selecting newsgathering methods. 157  In
Risenhoover v. England, news trucks surrounded the Branch Davidian
compound about an hour before federal agents intended to raid
it.158 An injured federal agent sued members of the media, alleg-
ing negligence.15 9 The reporters were found negligent and liable
because the court concluded that it was foreseeable that media
presence would alarm the Branch Davidians that something would
soon take place.' 60
Liability under claims of negligence has also been imposed
where a member of the media reported the name and address of a
victim or witness to a crime before the perpetrator was in cus-
tody.161 If the facts indicate that further criminal action by the per-
petrator was a foreseeable result of the disclosure, liability may be
imposed. 162
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving new-
sgathering conduct and alleged negligence. The Court, however,
has never granted immunity to members of the media who publish
information that a reasonably prudent journalist would not
print.163 If a foreseeable harm does occur, the media may face lia-
Id. at 627; see also Katherine Graham, Terrorism & the Media, L.A. Daily J., Daily J.
Rep., May 2, 1986, at 10, 16. "The electronic media in the U.S. live or die by their
ratings, the number of viewers they attract. As a result, each network wants to be
the first with the most on any big story." Id.; see also Becker, supra note 14, at 628.
"The intense competition between networks to be the first to report a particular
story sometimes leads reporters to engage in dangerous newsgathering and broad-
casting activities." Id. at 628.
156. See id. at 627. "The media now aggressively pursues breaking stories and
demands complete access to ongoing situations." Id. While the benefit of live cov-
erage has been a better informed public, the costs have been serious problems for
law enforcement and, in some cases, the lives of hostages and responding officers
have been put at risk. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Risenhoover, 936 F. Supp. at 408.
159. See id. at 396.
160. See Davidson, supra note 55, at 246. The media's conduct, the court said,
allowed the Branch Davidians time to prepare and forcibly resist. See id. Not only
can media outfits eliminate the element of surprise but, as commentators note,
they can increase the danger of stand-off type situations. See Becker, supra note 14,
at 630. Despite police restrictions, media members cross police lines seeking a
superior point of view. See id. Suspects may perceive the media as being in a safe
zone, into which the police will not fire. See id. Police may have to change their
focus from capturing a fleeing suspect to protecting a media member. See id.
161. See Davidson, supra note 55; see also notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
162. See id. at 252-56.
163. See id.
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bility for negligence even if the information was lawfully ob-
tained.1 64 Thus, negligence suits constitute an increasing risk to
the financial health of the media. 165
6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Members of the media may be found liable for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, as well as for any bodily harm result-
ing from a plaintiffs distress.166 The plaintiff must show that the
defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the
intention or with reckless disregard for the likelihood of causing
emotional distress, and that defendant's conduct was the actual or
proximate cause of the plaintiffs extreme or severe emotional dis-
tress.167 Where the claim arises from publication, additional bur-
dens of proof are placed on the plaintiff.168 Jacqueline Onassis
prevailed in such a claim against photographer Galella. 169
In Green v. Chicago Tribune Co.,' 70 the court allowed the plain-
tiff, Mrs. Green, to proceed with a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against The Chicago Tribune because a reasonable
jury could have found The Tribune liable. 17 1 In this case, The Chicago
164. See id. at 256.
165. See id. at 230.
166. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988); see also
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 758 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Green v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Il1. 1996); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. App. 4th 1023 (1995); Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1487; 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 681 (1986) (all remanding intentional infliction of emotion distress
claims for factual determinations by juries); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46. But see Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 809 (R.I.
1996) (requiring physical harm and prohibiting liability for suicide absent showing
that defendant intended to cause suicide and was substantial actor in causing
suicide).
167. See, e.g., Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681; see also Green, 675 N.E.2d at 256
(holding that extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to create liability for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress is conduct exceeding all possible bounds
of decency).
168. See id; see also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46. This additional burden stems from
the reporter's First Amendment right to publish truthful information about a mat-
ter of public importance. See Green, 675 N.E.2d at 257.
169. See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
170. 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 1996). In Green, Chicago Tribune reporters pub-
lished statements they overheard Mrs. Green say to her dying son. See id. at 251.
Mrs. Green had refused to give a public statement and had refused to allow the
Tribune to photograph her dying son. See id. Not only did the Tribune publish
her statement over her objection, it also prevented Mrs. Green from entering her
son's hospital room while it photographed her dying son. See id.
171. See id. at 256. The lower court had dismissed the claim based on the
newspaper's First Amendment Rights to gather news. See id.
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Tribune entered her dying son's hospital room, over his and Mrs.
Green's objections, and taped their conversations.' 7 2 Because the
conduct that allegedly caused the emotional distress to Mrs. Green
involved both publication and newsgathering, Mrs. Green was re-
quired to meet the additional burden of proving that the informa-
tion published by The Tribune was not of legitimate public
importance. 173
In Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 174 CBS reporters accompanied a domes-
tic violence counselor into the house of the plaintiff, Mrs. Baugh,
immediately following an attack on her by her husband, and filmed
Mrs. Baugh's interview with the counselor. 175 The court declined
to dismiss the claim because the defendants knew that they were
entering the plaintiffs home and filming her during a moment of
extreme emotional vulnerability. 176
In Miller v. NBC,177 NBC reporters followed a paramedic team
into the home of the plaintiff, Mrs. Miller, and filmed the
paramedics' effort to resuscitate her husband Mr. Miller during a
fatal heart attack. 178 NBC broadcast the footage on more than one
occasion. 179 The court found NBC's conduct in entering the home
and in airing the footage to be arguably outrageous and definitely
reckless in its disregard for Mrs. Miller's probable emotional dis-
tress.'80 Accordingly, the court sent the case to a jury to decide
liability.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 257-58. The newsgathering and the publication provided the
factual basis of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id.
This requirement evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Hustler, the injury to Reverend Jerry Falwell re-
sulted only from publication. See id. at 50. In this situation, Hustler published a
parody of Falwell. See id. at 47-48. Falwell could only prevail on a claim against the
magazine under the generally applicable laws regarding intentional infliction of
emotional distress if he could also show actual malice. See id. at 52-53. "The Hustler
opinion stood for the proposition that violations of general laws emanating from
publication also require proof of actual malice." See Stem, supra note 13, at 117.
The Court seemed to require that generally applicable laws will be subjected to
heightened scrutiny where publication is the conduct that allegedly violated a gen-
erally applicable law. See id.
174. 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
175. See id. at 758. For a discussion of the intrusion claims based on the
means employed to procure entry into Mrs. Baugh's home, see supra notes 98-99
and accompanying text.
176. See Baugh, 828 F. Supp. at 758.
177. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986).
178. See id. at 682.
179. See id.
180. See id. NBC entered Miller's home without consent and broadcast Mr.
Miller's fatal heart attack once without consent and a second time despite pleas
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B. Gaps in Protection Due to Application and Interpretation
On its face, this line of cases strongly suggests that existing gen-
erally applicable laws are sufficient to hold the media accountable
where its newsgathering conduct has placed an individual in fear or
at risk of bodily harm.181 A more thorough evaluation, however,
reveals significant gaps in the protection provided by generally ap-
plicable laws.182 For example, the tort of intrusion is limited to in-
vasions of privacy that occur in private places.' 83 Courts have
rigidly adhered to this rule to the detriment of plaintiffs and the
right of privacy.' 8 4
Media defendants have won several cases in state courts under
this "no invasion of privacy in a public place" rationale. 18 5 For ex-
ample, in Mark v. Seattle Times,186 the Washington Supreme Court
from the family that the footage not be broadcast. See id. Accordingly, the court
believed that a jury could find intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
court left it to a jury to determine whether the conduct was actually outrageous,
overturning the lower court's dismissal of Mrs. Miller's claim. See id.
181. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 990-95.
182. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 994, 1009. "Tort law clings stubbornly to
the principle that privacy cannot be invaded in or from a public place." Id. Even if
this rule was once sound, it is outdated "in a modem technological society where
the video camcorder has become a permanent fixture and where invasive tabloid
and reality television programming have become standard forms ofjournalism and
entertainment." Id at 990-91. "Instances of intrusive conduct in public places are
becoming increasingly common and more brazen." Id. at 991.
183. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 990 (noting that almost all courts interpret
intrusion tort not to protect individuals in places accessible to public); see also,
Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 942; Hernandez, supra note 72, at 442 (arguing that
claims of intrusion where plaintiff is in public place are wholly unavailing). The
comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, regarding the tort of in-
trusion, discuss the limits of the tort with respect to public places. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
184. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 994-96. The courts' rigid adherence to
this rule "demonstrates an incomplete comprehension of the nature of privacy and
the interests it is designed to protect." Id. at 995. With courts holding on to this
rule, plaintiffs "lose early and often." Id. at 992.
It is interesting to note that the statutory right of privacy in France is not
absolute. SeeJeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Bran-
deis Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1219, 1225-46,
1249 (1994). Even with strong protection from intrusion upon personal life, there
are limits on privacy in public. See id.
In marked contrast to personal life, disclosures of one's professional and
public life are not protected. When a person is participating in public
life in the sense of being out and about, he can expect his activities to be
public knowledge. If a person is featured at a public event, occupies a
background spot in a representation of a public place, or is part of a
group photograph, the person cannot complain of the use of his image.
Id. at 1249. Nevertheless, there is greater privacy in public, provided that one is
engaged in one's personal life, than there is in the United States. See id.
185. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 942.
186. 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
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concluded that a television cameraman's filming of the inside of a
store from the sidewalk outside did not constitute an intrusion. 187
The Court reasoned that the site of the "filming was open to the
public and anyone passing by the pharmacy could have viewed the
actions taped on film. 1 88
There are, however, several cases where courts have permitted
plaintiffs to recover for invasions of privacy in public places by im-
plication or through tort theories other than intrusion.18 9 In re-
cent years, courts have more explicitly recognized public or semi-
public privacy. 190 For example, in Wolfson, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania departed from precedent to find that an intrusion
could exist in a "public or semi-public place."1 91 The court held that
conduct that "amounts to a persistent course of hounding, harass-
ment and unreasonable surveillance," could reach the "level of in-
vasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion." 192
Notwithstanding this part of the decision, the Wolfson court refused
to grant an injunction with respect to the plaintiffs' trespass claim
due to its uncertainty as to whether, under state law, an actionable
trespass could occur in a public place. 193 Other cases, such as Shul-
man v. Group W Productions, Inc.194 and Green v. Chicago Tribune
Co.,1 9 5 support the conclusion that intrusion claims can withstand
187. See Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1124 (1982). The photographer was not just filming the inside of the store,
the photographer was filming through the window of his locked pharmacy, the
actions of a pharmacist who had been indicted for Medicaid fraud. See id.
188. Id. at 1095; see also Kovner, et al., supra note 57, at 255; Haymie v. Zim-
lich, 508 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio Com. P1. 1986).
189. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 1044-55. In several cases, courts have im-
pliedly recognized a right of privacy in public. See id. For example, in Galella v.
Onassis, the "district and appellate court judges assumed that Galella invaded the
privacy of Onassis and her children, even though most of his conduct occurred in
public places." Id. at 1048.
190. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 1044-49.
191. Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. at 1420. The Dietemann case is also note-
worthy in that it is the case wherein the Ninth Circuit first recognized the tort of
intrusion, "an invasion of privacy, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres
from which an ordinary man in plaintiffs position could reasonably expect that
the particular defendant should be excluded." Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 940
(citing Dietemann, 444 F.2d at 249; quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704
(D.C. Cir. 1969)).
192. Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1420.
193. See id.
194. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (June 1, 1998).
195. 675 N.E.2d 249, 256 (1996).
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challenges where the intrusion took place in semi-public places like
a hospital room and a rescue helicopter. 196
Many commentators believe that people have a legitimate ex-
pectation of a certain degree of privacy "even when they are visible
in or from places open to the public. '19 7 These commentators
maintain that "public privacy" must be recognized to protect those
who are subjected to highly offensive public intrusions yet currently
have no recourse in the legal system. 198
Another criticism levied against generally applicable laws is
that judges are generally wary, if not hostile, towards the privacy
tort.199 This wariness flows from the problem of defining the com-
mon-law right of privacy.200 A cause of action that eludes definition
196. See Shulman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864; Green, 675 N.E.2d at 256. in addi-
tion, the Shulman decision indicates that the surrounding circumstances instead of
mere location, may determine whether an intrusion has occurred. See Shulman, 74
Cal. Rptr. at 867. Specifically, the Shulman court found that ajury might conclude
that media intrusion upon an injured plaintiff's conversations with rescue workers
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See id
197. McClurg, supra note 13, at 995.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 1004. Some commentators argue that judicial ambivalence to-
wards the privacy tort has to do with inherent ambiguities of the tort. See id. at
1006. Partially due to the "free speech implications of many privacy cases, courts
no doubt feel obliged to screen privacy cases carefully before sending them to
juries. However, it also appears that some judges simply 'don't get it' when it
comes to complaints of invasion of privacy." Id.; see also Hauch, supra note 184 at
1225-26. Some commentators believe that by erring on the side of First Amend-
ment caution, courts shrink potential press liability but eliminate the chilling effect
of uncertainties. See id.
200. See Hauch, supra note 184, at 1225-26. Critics argue that in the pluralis-
tic, multicultural democracy of the United States, it is impossible to develop worka-
ble standards that achieve a proper balance between the flow of free information
and the privacy interests of individuals. See id.
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is dangerous to a free press, which may be chilled by the fear of
liability. 201 It also presents a danger to the right to privacy.20 2
A recent Seventh Circuit case, Desnick v. ABC,203 illustrates that
courts tend to err on the side of First Amendment caution. 20 4 The
Desnick court stated that regardless of how "shrill, one-sided and of-
fensive" tabloid investigative reporting can be, if the broadcast con-
tains no actionable defamation and no invasion of "established"
rights, the plaintiff has no legal remedy.205 Absent actionable defa-
mation, the court elected not to view privacy as an established
right.20 6 Accordingly, all the plaintiffs other claims fell into the
gaps. 207 The Desnick case reflects both the reluctance of courts to
201. See id. Hauch notes that in France, where the right to privacy has long
been recognized by both the courts and the legislature, the governing bodies ac-
knowledge the fact that precise definition is impossible. See id "The right is meant
to provide each individual with the security that he will be free from unwarranted
intrusions so that he may enjoy a certain liberty as he lives his private life in a free
society." Id. at 1222. The chosen method is an enumeration within designated
categories of information. See id. The basic areas covered include family life, sex-
ual activity and orientation, illness and death, and even private repose and leisure.
See id.
One commentator, Gonzalez, argues around the problems in defining privacy
by claiming that the information sought by many paparazzi is not sufficiently news-
worthy to be granted protection by the First Amendment. See Gonzalez, supra note
33, at 947. Warren and Brandeis excluded from the right of privacy information
that is of legitimate concern. See id. at 943. This exclusion, referred to as the
newsworthiness privilege, has been understood such that "if a matter is deemed
,newsworthy' there can be no invasion of privacy based upon a [publication]." Id.
Gonzalez argues that newsworthiness has always excluded "mere curiosity" and
.sensational prying into private lives." Id. at 947. If the information sought is not
of legitimate public concern, there can be no protection for the right to gather the
information. See id. For this reason, some commentators believe that the intrusion
cause of action is an effective weapon against paparazzi press. See id. at 936.
202. See id.
203. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). ABC assured Desnick that its investigation
of his opthamology clinic would be fair and balanced, involving no ambush inter-
views or undercover surveillance. See id. After Desnick agreed to the investigation,
however, ABC dispatched undercover patients equipped with concealed cameras
and recording devices. See id. Desnick alleged defamation, violations of federal
and state wiretapping statutes, trespass, invasion of privacy, and fraud. See id. at
1350-51. The district court's decision granting summaryjudgment on the defama-
tion claim was remanded. See i&
204. See Stem, supra note 13, at 141. According to Stem, the Desnick decision
involved deference to the First Amendment protections for newsgathering, where
absent defamation, the newsgathering is not deemed to be challengeable. See id.
205. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355. This is so regardless of how "surreptitious,
confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly" the investigative tactics may
be. See id. The court went on to hold that no "established right under either state
law or federal . . . law was infringed by the making of the broadcast ... " Id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1352. The trespass claim failed because the entry into a busi-
ness was "not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of interest of the plaintiffs
that the law of trespass protects, it was not an interference with the ownership or
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define privacy and a trend wherein courts will not allow plaintiffs to
prevail on newsgathering claims unless they can prevail on their
defamation claims.20 8
In sum, cases that have considered generally applicable laws
suggest that measures available in the United States to hold the me-
dia civilly or criminally accountable are only sufficient to punish
certain harms. 209 While some of these causes of action have the
potential to redress paparazzi intrusions, the ultimate success of
suits brought under these theories remains uncertain.210 The fol-
lowing section discusses whether existing criminal and civil meas-
ures will be sufficient to deter and prevent dangerous media
conduct in the future.
IV. PREVENTION
What will it take to prevent future tragedies similar to the one
which killed Princess Diana? Some lawmakers propose stringent
legislation to specifically address privacy invasions by the media, in-
cluding intrusions and trespasses, to prevent future tragedies.21'
Others suggest that the issue is one of economics.212 Adherents to
possession of land." Id. at 1353. The wiretapping claims failed because one party
to the conversation (the undercover reporters) consented to the taping. See id.
The privacy claims failed because there was no disclosure of private facts or intru-
sion into legitimately private activities. See id.
208. See Medical Laboratory Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc. 931 F. Supp.
1487 (D. Ariz. 1996) (citing Unelko v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990)).
209. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 990-95.
210. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 936. Tabloid television producers consist-
ently defend such lawsuits by arguing that Supreme Court decisions protect the
publication of truthful information, and that imposing liability would have a "chil-
ling effect" on the exercise of their First Amendment rights. See id.
211. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 13. The press is not subject to external
regulation. See Everette E. Dennis, Internal Examination: Self-Regulation and the Amer-
ican Media, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 697, 698 (1995). The American news
media has, however, "experimented with a wide range of [voluntary] self-regula-
tory approaches to accountability, ranging from commission-style critiques and
recommendations to codes of ethics, press councils, media criticism projects, in-
sider assessment vehicles, public opinion polling, and even the education and
training of journalists and other media people." Id.
212. S. Dennis, sup-.-. note 211, at 704. Voluntary efforts at accountability
have often been the result of public opinion research and the resulting concerns
about the profit motive. See id. Even as early as 1947, when the Commission on
Freedom of the Press published its Hutchins Commission Reports, the media's
concern with profit motive was criticized. See Lee C. Bollinger, A Free and Responsi-
ble Press: Why There Should Be an Independent Decennial Commission on the Press, 1993
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5 (1993). The profit motive is frequently criticized as over-
whelming or overpowering professional journalistic judgment; see id; see also Neil
Hickey, Money Lust: How Pressure for Profit is Perverting Journalism, COLUM. JOUR.
REV., July 8, 1998, at 28. Increased sensitivity to profit and all things financial has
changed the face of news, reporting and journalism resulting in the tabloidization
19991 203
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the latter view believe that where the liability and costs of placing
individuals in fear or at risk of bodily harm outweigh the benefits of
acquiring and publishing the photographs, economics will curb the
conduct.213 Others suggest that the economics of consumer choice
and public opinion can halt the conduct.214 Others suggest that
juries, more sensitive as a result of tragedies like the death of Prin-
cess Diana, will help to rein in the media.215 Still others suggest
that only internal mechanisms within the journalism industry will
work. 216
The theory of deterrence is intuitively appealing.2 17 Many be-
lieve, of course, that if the penalties for committing proscribed con-
duct were swift, certain and severe, crime would diminish.2 18 The
scientific theory of deterrence involves a number of assumptions
such as the notion that offenders are rational actors who weigh the
relative costs and benefits of criminal acts and are knowledgeable
of much reporting and the subordination of journalistic values to the maximiza-
tion of short-term profits. See id. at 29-30.
213. See Paparazzi Relentless, supra note 1. Currently, profits are huge and
money is driving the market. See id.; see also, Susan Caba, Public Points Finger at Press,
YoRIK DAILY REcoRD, Sept. 1, 1997. For example,just one day after Princess Diana's
fatal car crash, "photographs of Diana dying in her wrecked Mercedes Benz report-
edly were being peddled to publishers with price tags of anywhere between
$250,000 to $1 million." Id. The theory that adjusting the cost benefit equation
will change the media's behavior presupposes a theory of deterrence, which may
or may not be viable. See infra, notes 219-22 and accompanying text; see Tim Jones,
Backlash Could Force Scrutiny of Media Intrusion, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Sept. 1,
1997, at Al.
214. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 1017. Some argue that the blame for such
newsgathering conduct must be shared by those who engage in it and by those who
perpetuate it by purchasing the finished product. See id. "If it did not sell, it would
cease to exist. Regrettably, the American public has proven to be an all too willing
consumer of shocking, titillating, and voyeuristic entertainment." Id.; see alsoJones
supra note 213, at Al. Even after the Princess' fatal crash and during the condem-
nation of the press, the public's appetite remained. See id. In fact, in the week
after Diana's death many British papers, including tabloids, broke prior sales
records. See Brian MacArthur, Unease Hardens into a New Code, THE TIMES OF
LONDON, Sept. 24, 1997, at 25.
215. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 26-27. "Jurors, reflective of growing anti-
paparazzi public sentiment, tend to see the celebrity as the victim in a paparazzi
confrontation regardless of the circumstances, say many media lawyers." Id
216. See Rush, supra note 9, at 20. Rush proposes a national code of ethics to
be adopted by media outlets. See id.
217. See Samuel Walker, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS: A
POLICY GUIDE 101 (3rd ed. 1994).
218. See id. at 101; see also, James Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 117
(1985). When one tries to weigh the costs of committing a crime against the bene-
fits of committing crime, it becomes clear that the costs are relative and uncertain,
the chances of getting caught and being charged are unpredictable and any result-
ing penalty will come only after a long delay. See id. at 118.
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enough to understand the costs involved.219 Some theorists, how-
ever, believe that the threat of punishment plays a relatively minor
role in shaping behavior.
220
A. External Measures
This section assesses measures external to the journalistic in-
dustry that might be imposed on the media, to determine whether
media conduct that places an individual in fear or at risk of bodily
harm would best be prevented by externally-imposed or self-im-
posed measures.
1. Application of Existing Laws
Perhaps additional decisions interpreting existing tort laws will
provide the parameters within which the media will act.221 This
would serve not only to protect victims of irresponsible newsgather-
ing conduct, but also to protect media defendants from the perils
of unpredictable law. 222 As case law that sets the parameters of law-
ful conduct evolves, the media's conduct should evolve accord-
ingly.223 For example, the law of defamation may provide a model.
Where the Supreme Court has clearly set parameters around de-
famatory statements with regard to public figures, the media knows
where to draw the lines. 224 While the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the media is not immune from liability for violation of
219. See Walker, supra note 217, at 101-02.
220. See id. at 119. "For the moment.... we have to conclude that there is no
evidence to support the basic assumptions behind deterrence theory: that we can
reduce crime, or certain crimes, by increasing either the certainty or severity of
punishment." Id.
221. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 13, at 140-45.
222. See Barnett, supra note 13, at 441. The case law regarding investigative
reporting and gaining access to information by subterfuge, for example, is so un-
clear as to be wholly inadequate to provide reporters with guideposts within which
to behave. Such unpredictable law results in a chilling effect on all newsgathering
conduct. See id. at 441-46. "Because the line between protected newsgathering
and tortious newsgathering is difficult to draw, a reporter is likely to eschew certain
nonroutine newsgathering methods such as subterfuge and to engage in rational
self-censorship even in cases where his conduct would ultimately be lawful and
would produce valuable information." Id. at 447; see also Alison Lynn Tuley, Note:
Outtakes, Hidden Cameras, and the First Amendment: A Reporter's Privilege, 38 WM. &
MARY L. Rv. 1817, 1849 (1997). In order to protect the First Amendment rights
of the media, the existing substantive law should be more rigorously implemented.
See id.
223. See id.
224. See Lebel, supra note 29, at 1146. "There is a rich and growing body of
case law and scholarly explication on the ways in which the First Amendment pro-
tects the publication of material." Id. The Supreme Court has effectively estab-
lished the contours of the tort of defamation. See id. at 1148-49.
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generally applicable laws, there is no comparable Supreme Court
decision directly speaking to newsgathering conduct that violates
generally applicable laws by placing individuals in fear or at risk of
bodily harm. 225 Future Supreme Court decisions expressly af-
firming the type of decisions made in Wolfson, Galella and
Risenhoover would solidify the parameters of the law around new-
sgathering and set valuable guidelines for the media.226
2. Enacting New Laws
In May 1998, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced to the Sen-
ate a proposed Personal Privacy Protection Act.2 27 This proposed
federal legislation would make it "a federal crime to chase people
'in a manner that causes them to have a reasonable fear of bodily
injury' in order to photograph, film or otherwise record their activi-
ties for commercial purposes."228 The proposed legislation would
also expand the law of trespass to encompass the use of telephoto
lenses or infrared film "to obtain images that otherwise could not
be captured without trespassing."229 Senators Feinstein, Boxer and
Hatch introduced the Personal Privacy Protection Act because they
believed that existing laws fail to protect people from dangerous
and abusive newsgathering tactics.230 The sponsors believed this
legislation was necessary because the "line between legitimate news
gathering and invasion of privacy" is crossed "more and more fre-
quently today by an increasingly aggressive cadre of fortune-seekers
with cameras."231
The drafters of this proposed legislation intended the bill to be
narrow, targeting "threatening and endangering harassment and
privacy abuses undertaken by the stalker press."23 2 While the draft-
225. See id.
226. See Stern, supra note 13 at 146 (noting that chilling effect of unpredict-
able defamation claims was considered by Supreme Court in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan in establishing actual malice rule).
227. See Feinstein, supra note 13.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Feinstein, supra note 13.
231. Id.; see also Proposed US Bill Would Rein in Paparazzi, supra note 13.
232. See Feinstein, supra note 13. The drafters cited flaws in harassment, reck-
less endangering, stalking, trespass, and intrusion laws as examples of why a uni-
form federal law is needed. See id; see also Good Morning America: Introducing the
Personal Privacy Protection Act, (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1998) (broadcast-
ing statement by Erwin Chemerinsky, University of Southern California law profes-
sor who consulted on proposed legislation); see also David Robb, SAG Shoots Back at
Paparazzi, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 18, 1998 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky). The
Senators insisted that their legislation would not trample on the First Amendment
fights of the press. See id. The drafters sought not to limit legitimate newsgather-
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ers recognized that state laws exist that proscribe trespass and reck-
less endangerment, they stressed the need for the consistency
which federal legislation could provide. 235 The drafters claimed
that existing laws are too uncertain to adequately protect people in
the public eye.
23 4
Any such legislation, if enacted, would certainly face constitu-
tional challenges. 235 While Senator Feinstein urges that her team
of legal experts labored to ensure a "constitutional bill that fully
respects First Amendment and other constitutional rights," judicial
scrutiny may prove otherwise.23 6 The ACLU clearly opposes this
measure as burdening the First Amendment, yet some legal schol-
ars, who found prior legislative attempts at targeting the paparazzi
ing in any way, aiming the legislation not at the vast majority of those in the main-
stream media but at the abusive, threatening behavior by some who do not respect
the line between public and private. See id.
233. See Good Morning America: Introducing the Personal Privacy Protection Act,
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1998) (broadcasting statement by Richard
Masur, President, Screen Actors Guild).
234. See Feinstein, supra note 13; see also Barnett, supra note 13, at 448-49.
Other commentators have warned of the chilling effect unpredictable tort law can
have. See Grossman, supra note 34, at 592. Uncertainty in the area of tort liability
for newsgathering makes it hard for attorneys to advise media clients about what
conduct will generate a lawsuit. See id. As a result, speech can be chilled. See id.;
see also Feinstein, supra note 13. State and local harassment laws are not always
codified or well grounded in precedent. See id. The reckless endangerment stat-
utes are applied inconsistently at best. See id. Anti-stalking ordinances do not usu-
ally apply to activities undertaken for commercial purposes or require proof of the
criminal intent to cause fear. See id. Senator Feinstein clearly acknowledged that it
was Princess Diana's death that propelled this legislation. See id.; see also Feinstein,
supra note 13. Proposed US Bill Would Rein in Paparazzi, supra note 13. Anti-
paparazzi legislation was first considered two years ago. See id. The bill was put on
hold until the death of the Princess "brought the seriousness of the problem home
with a blunt force that stunned the world." Id.; see also Fiore, supra note 12, at Al.
235. Commentators already assert that such legislation is likely overbroad and
unconstitutionally vague. SeeJoyce, supra note 9.
236. See Feinstein, supra note 13; see also Note, Privacy, Photography, and the
Press, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1086 (1998). Because this statute, unlike generally appli-
cable laws, is directed towards photographers with commercial purposes, it is ar-
guably content and viewpoint-based; this statute could easily be viewed as singling
out the press or certain elements thereof. Such laws are "always subject to at least
some degree to heightened First Amendment Scrutiny." Tuiner Broadan-Sys-
tern, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994). In Turner, the Supreme Court held
that a provision requiring cable companies to carry network programming im-
posed special obligations and burdens on cable programmers, thus requiring
"some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 641; see also Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986). This statute
imposes special burdens on commercial photographers and thus should also face
heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Additionally, even conduct and speech
cannot be regulated in a viewpoint or content based fashion. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). This statute is regulating otherwise tortious and criminal
conduct and speech in a viewpoint-based fashion. It is clearly regulating based on
the commercial intentions and press interests that may have inspired the conduct.
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unconstitutional, believe this bill should survive constitutional
scrutiny.237
B. Internal Changes
This section explores mechanisms that the media can adopt to
prevent conduct that places individuals in fear or at risk of bodily
harm.
1. Press Councils and Codes of Ethics
a. Press Councils
Various mechanisms have been used to impose controls on the
media.238 In some countries, governments have established press
councils authorized to handle press conduct.23 9 In other countries,
the press has voluntarily convened press councils. 240 The press
councils that have existed throughout the years have differed in the
degrees of authority they command.2 41
Groups have tried various plans to force social responsibility on
the American media, including press councils.242 The press coun-
cils that have existed throughout the years in the United States have
been wholly voluntary. 243 Only two news councils have possessed
237. See Fiore, supra note 12, at Al. This bill is different because it is not
prohibiting speech or affecting First Amendment rights of speech or press. See id.
This bill is regulating conduct that state governments have already regulated. See
id. Because endangering someone is not protected conduct under the First
Amendment, the conduct regulated by this bill is conduct that the government
constitutionally can regulate. See id. Federal legislation is necessary, because it
'would fill in the gaps and send a message that the problem has grown severe
enough to require congressional intervention." Id.
238. See generally PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(Pnine Lahav, ed., 1985).
239. See id. As discussed, infra at notes 265-71 and accompanying text, Eng-
land is one of the countries whose government originally convened its press
council.
240. See id.
241. See id. As discussed, infra at notes 245-65, 272-80 and accompanying text,
the United States and Germany are countries whose press has voluntarily convened
press councils.
242. See Louise W. Hermanson, The National News Council is Not a Dead Issue,
BEYOND THE COURTROOM: ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING PREss DIsPuTEs 15 (Rich-
ard T. Kaplar, ed., 1991). In 1947, the Hutchins Commission warned that for the
press to remain free in the United States, it must be more responsible. See id. at 15-
16. The Hutchins Commission urged imposing checks and balances on the media
through an evaluative body that could discuss newsgathering practices and criticize
irresponsible media conduct. See id.
243. See Aviam Soifer, Freedom of the Press in the United States, PRESS LAw IN MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115 (Pnina Lahav, ed., 1985). The only
significant national press council is the National News Council established in 1973.
See id. The Minnesota News Council, begun in 1971, is the only news council re-
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adjudicative powers in the United States. 244 Their effect on media
performance and responsibility has been questionable because
their powers have been limited to issuing and publishing
decisions.2
45
The National News Council was founded in 1973 as a private
and independent institution under the premise that the function of
a news council was: "(1) to give the public a forum for complaints
about media performance; (2) to give the media feedback concern-
ing how the public perceives their role in a democratic society; and
(3) to give society unbiased reports on how the media responds to
responsibilities individual members of a democratic society have to
the whole."
24 6
The National News Council claimed to be a dispute resolution
alternative for viable legal claims and for claims that would never
prevail in a court of law.247 It failed, however, for several reasons. 248
The national scope of the Council's purpose largely contributed to
its downfall.249 The founders quickly realized that the National
News Council could not possibly handle "complaints from all citi-
zens about all media organizations throughout the country" and re-
stricted the council to hearing complaints and studying issues of
national importance involving national media.2 50
Another factor that contributed to the downfall of the National
News Council was its limited power.25 1 The council could neither
impose fines nor force any type of apology or restitution from a
maining in 1991. See Hermanson, supra note 242, at 15. The National News Coun-
cil began in 1973 but was short lived, lasting only until 1984. See id. It was the only
other American news council to adjudicate cases. See id. Both of these News Coun-
cils were "successful in calling the media to task for ethical violations." Id.
244. See id. Most other news councils have held mere advisory positions. See
id.
245. See id. But see Jerome H. Barron, The Search of Media Accountability, 19
Surrou U.L. REv. 789, 789-90 (1985). In 1985, studies indicated that libel litigants
were suing media defendants more for vindication, reprisal, response and publicity
than for damages. See id. This was demonstrated by the fact that "a significant
number of individuals ... believing that they were victimized by the press, [were]
willing to sustain great expense to bring libel suits. These individuals [did] this
with he knowledge that damages obtained at trial [were] uly to sur-,,e ap
peal. In short, they sue[d] even though they [lost]." Id.
246. Hermanson, supra note 242, at 20-21.
247. See id. at 21. The Council required complainants to stipulate that they
were not currently engaged in or contemplating legal action. See id. at 22-23.
248. See id. at 18.
249. See id. The National News Council also faced funding problems. See id.
250. Id.
251. See Hermanson, supra note 242, at 18. The council could only publish its
decisions. See id. at 15.
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media member found to have violated journalistic standards.2 52
This limited authority, coupled with the fact that internal enforce-
ment of "ethical rules or standards of reporting are rare," created
standards of conduct that had no teeth.253 Several commentators,
however, believe that a press council could serve as an alternative
forum for dispute resolution in the future, provided that lessons
from the failure of the earlier news councils are corrected. 25 4
The Minnesota News Council began in 1971 as "an independ-
ent, nongovernmental, non-profit, voluntary organization that
serves as a forum through which individuals and/or corporations
can present a complaint when they feel an injustice has been done
because of inaccurate and/or unfair reporting of the news."255 The
Council is comprised of an equal number of media and general
public members. 256 To bring a case before the Council, the com-
plainant must waive the right to appeal to any court or to the
FCC.257 The News Council receives written summaries from the
parties, conducts a public hearing and issues a decision, which
members of the local media agree to publicize.25 8
The British Press Council was established in 1953.259 In 1962,
its purposes were declared to be the preservation of the "estab-
lished freedom of the British press," the maintenance of the charac-
ter of the British Press "in accordance with the highest professional
and commercial standards," the consideration of complaints about
the press and the finding of ways "to deal with these complaints in
252. See id. at 18.
253. See Soifer, supra note 243, at 115. Over the past several years, however,
many large news organizations have hired "house critics" or "ombudsman." Id. at
117. Sometimes, these individuals publish their findings and criticisms of internal
practices. See id. Other newspapers have relied on features like op-ed pages as
their internal control mechanisms and forums for criticism. See id.
254. See Hermanson, supra note 242, at 29.
255. Dennis Hale, ADR and The Minnesota News Council on Libe4 49-JUN. DisP.
RESOL. J. 77 (1994).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. The Council has, at times, agreed to hear cases from other states.
See id.
259. See Michael Supperstone, Press Law in the United Kingdom, in PRss LAw IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 46 (Pnina Lahav, ed., 1985). The
Press Council was a central recommendation of the 1949 Commission but was not
established until legislation requiring it was threatened in 1953. See id. Initially, its
membership was limited to members of the press. See id. It was also limited in its
financing and in its purpose. See id. After several years, the Press Council was
found to be ineffective, partly because of its exclusively media membership, and in
response to recommendations of the 1977 Younger Commission, the membership
was recomposed to contain an equal number of lay people and media members.
See id. at 47.
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whatever manner might seem practical and appropriate and record
result and action," and the publication of "periodical reports re-
cording the Council's work and to review, from time to time, devel-
opments in the press and the factors affecting them."
260
The primary duty of the Press Council was to investigate com-
plaints and hold quasijudicial adjudication.261 The Press Council
had no statutory authority to impose fines or suspensions.2 62 Pun-
ishments it could impose were limited to requiring its decisions
against a media agency to be published with prominence equivalent
to that given the offending conduct.2 63 In 1991, a quasi-govern-
mental body called the Press Complaints Commission, succeeded
the Press Council. 264
260. Supperstone, Press Law in the United Kingdom, supra note 259, at 47; see
also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Autonomy, Community, And Traditions Of Liberty: The
Contrast Of British And American Privacy Law. 1990 DuKE L.J. 1398 (1991). The right
of privacy does not receive explicit recognition in English law. See id. To the ex-
tent that privacy rights exist implicitly in Britain, they are formulated quite differ-
ently than in the United States. See id. at 1402. British citizens, in light of
Parliament's inaction, have attempted to circumvent the legislature by petitioning
the British courts to create a common law right of privacy. See id. Without fail, the
courts have refused because Parliament was studying the issue. See id. Ultimately,
Parliament took no action, and in the late 1970s the issue of a common law right of
privacy remained before the courts. See id. at 1412; see also Frieden, supra note 15,
at 156. In fact, the British courts have decided that there is no right at all to
prevent taking a person's picture. See id. The courts, however, are likely to take
invasion of privacy into account in assessing damages when, for instance, the publi-
cation of such pictures damages a person's reputation. See id. In 1977, the
Younger Committee on Privacy considered a right to privacy or remedy for intru-
sion of privacy, but no right or remedy was recommended for enactment by the
committee. See id. British media does not enjoy a "freedom of the press" protec-
tion. See Frieden, supra note 15, at 154. Britain-like the United States, but unlike
most European countries-has no special statutes regarding the press. See id. In
accordance with the British constitutional principle of residual liberties, rights
such as freedom of the press exist even in the absence of written guarantees, unless
statutes or common law precedent have imposed restrictions on them. See id. The
only British statutes which limit newsgathering are criminal statutes aimed at pro-
tecting important state interests, such as information about defense installations.
See id. at 154.
261. See id. Decisions of the Press Council "constitute a body of case law; yet it
inot always clear on which basis- they are made." I'd Thiswaaubtnta criti-
cism of the 1977 Royal Commission on the Press which recommended drafting of
a code of conduct against which the conduct of media and the decision of the
Council could be measured. See id.
262. See id. at 48. In fact, a recommendation of the 1977 Royal Commission
on the Press to give the Council such authority was expressly rejected. See id.
263. See id. at 48; see also P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law And The Alternatives: Some Anglo-
American Comparisons, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1002, 1042 (1987) (noting that councils and
ombudsmen are beginning to provide alternatives to litigation).
264. See Supperstone, supra note 259, at 48. This body has been set up and
funded by newspaper owners at government request. See id,
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The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides
that "[e]veryone shall have the right freely to express and dissemi-
nate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures .... Freedom of
the press and freedom of reporting by radio and motion pictures
are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship." 265 There are, how-
ever, some limitations in German law. 266 General laws limit the
rights of free press and free expression, as do "legal provisions for
the protection of the youth, and . . . the right to personal
honour."267
In 1956, the two largest publishing organizations and the two
relevant unions of journalists in Germany formed the Deutscher
Presserat, modeled after the British Press Council. 268 The Deut-
scher Presserat was founded as a private association consisting of
twenty individuals who were equally divided between publishers
and union members. 269 The Deutscher Presserat's goals are to
Recognize and eliminate grievances, to investigate com-
plaints about specific publications and if necessary to rep-
rimand the newspaper or magazine, to establish
guidelines for ethical standards, to ensure free access to
news sources, to counteract dangers to free information
and the process of forming public opinion, which monop-
oly has brought, and to submit proposals to the
legislature. 270
The Deutscher Presserat has worked to protect the press as well
as its subjects. 2 7 1 For example, the Presserat has established itself as
an important advisor to the government and legislature, which has
successfully prevented efforts to constitutionally limit press free-
dom.2 72 The Presserat has also developed a code of ethics and
265. Frieden, supra note 15, at 164-65 (quoting Article 5(1) of the Basic Law
of the Federal Republic of Germany).
266. See id. at 165.
267. Frieden, supra note 15, at 166 (quoting Article 52(2) of the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany).
268. See Helmut Kohl, Press Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, PRESS LAW IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATvE STUDY 216-17 (Pnina Lahav, ed., 1985).
269. See id. at 217. The ultimate aim was to limit bias but, the Presserat has
not been devoid of bias by its members. See id. The members are present as dele-
gates of their union or publisher, and thus, have predetermined interests. See id.
270. Id.
271. See Kohl, supra note 268, at 217.
272. See id. The efforts were geared towards limiting press freedom in times
of war or internal state of emergency. See id.
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guidelines for editorial work, expressly setting forth professional
standards for journalists. 273
b. Press Codes of Ethics
The British press have responded to the Princess Diana tragedy
by creating a Code of Media Conduct.274 The Code has been well
273. See id. Both the code and the guidelines have been called remarkable.
See id.
274. See Greenslade, supra note 9, at B5. The code was composed by media
editors after politicians threatened a new law. See id.; see also Boshoff, supra note 9.
The code of conduct states in pertinent part:
GUIDANCE FOR JOURNALISTS
All members of the press have a duty to maintain the highest professional
and ethical standards. This code sets the benchmarks for those stan-
dards. It both protects the rights of the individual and upholds the pub-
lic's right to know. The code is the cornerstone of the system of self-
regulation to which the industry has made a binding commitment. Edi-
tors and publishers must ensure that the code is observed rigorously not
only by staff but also by anyone who contributes to their publications. It
is essential to the workings of an agreed code that it be honoured not
only to the letter but in the full spirit. The code should not be inter-
preted so narrowly as to compromise its commitment to respect the rights
of the individual, nor so broadly that it prevents publication in the public
interest.
It is the responsibility of editors to co-operate with the PCC as swiftly as
possible in the resolution of complaints. Any publication which is
criticised by the PCC under one of the following clauses must print the
adjudication which follows in full and with due prominence.
CODE OF PRACTICE
3 Privacy
(i) Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life,
home, health and correspondence. A publication will be expected tojus-
tify intrusions into any individual's private life without consent.
(ii) The use of long-lens photography to take pictures of people in private
places without their consent is unacceptable.
Note-Private places are public or private property where there is a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.
4 Harassment
(i) Journalists and photographers must neither obtain nor seek to obtain
information or pictures through intimidation, harassment or persistent
pursuit.
(ii) They must not photograph individuals in private places (as defined in
the note to Clause 3) without their consent; must not persist in telephon-
ing, questioning, pursuing or photographing individuals after having
been asked to desist; must not remain on their property after having been
asked to leave and must not follow them.
(iii) Editors must ensure that those working for them comply with these
requirements and must not publish material from other sources which
does not meet these requirements.
5 Intrusion into grief or shock
In cases involving grief or shock, inquiries must be carried out and ap-
proaches made with sympathy and discretion. Publication must be han-
dled sensitively at such times, but this should not be interpreted as
restricting the right to report judicial proceedings.
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received by news editors and politicians. 275 The Press Complaints
Commission will administer the Code. 276 The Press Complaints
Commission will have little power to sanction press conduct aside
from its ability to order a newspaper to publish a condemnatory
judgment if a complaint is upheld.277 The Code is certain to re-
ceive close scrutiny.278 Some believe that politicians and editors in
particular will attentively watch the tabloids for deviations from the
Code. 279
Some believe that a Code of Media Conduct like that passed by
the Press Complaints Council would be unthinkable in the United
States. 280 This is primarily because the Press Complaints Council is
a quasi-governmental body, and thus, would be subject to First
Amendment challenge in the United States.281 Organizations cur-
rently exist in the United States, such as the Society of Professional
Journalists and various media organizations, which have promul-
gated codes of ethics, with which media members are ethically
8 Listening Devices
Journalists must not obtain or publish material obtained by clandestine
listening devices or by intercepting private phone conversations.
9 Hospitals
(i) Journalists or photographers making inquiries at hospitals or similar
institutions must identify themselves to a responsible executive and ob-
tain permission before entering non-public areas.
(ii) The restrictions on intruding into privacy are particularly relevant to
inquiries about individuals in hospitals or similar institutions.
11 Misrepresentation
(i) Journalists must not generally obtain or seek to obtain information or
pictures through misrepresentation or subterfuge.
(ii) Subterfuge can be justified only in the public interest and only when
material cannot be obtained by any other means.
Id.
275. See Greenslade, supra note 9, at B5. The Code of Ethics "is a laudable
attempt to change the culture of the tabloids." Id.
276. See id. This body has been set up and is funded by newspaper owners at
government request to "ensure that papers do not trample on people's rights." Id.
277. See id.; see also British Press Congratulates Itself on Backing Tougher Privacy
Code, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 26, 1997 (avail. at 1997 WL 134002300). While
the privacy guidelines are hailed as the toughest in Europe, they fail to recom-
mend sanctions for newspapers that breach the new rules. See id.
278. See Greenslade, supra note 9, at B5.
279. See id
280. See Press Code of Conduct Unthinkable in the United States, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Sept. 26, 1997; see also British Editors Tackle Broad Press Reforms; Media: Their
Proposed Voluntary Ethics Code Calls for an End to Motorbike Chases, Stalking and Hound-
ing, THE ORANGE CouNrY REGISTER, Sept. 26, 1997, at A25.
281. See Press Code of Conduct Unthinkable in the United States, supra note 280; see
also British Editors Tackle Broad Press Reforms, supra note 280 at A25.
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bound to conform. 282 Additionally, several news organizations have
recently implemented specific ethical guidelines for undercover re-
porters, some of which require pre-newsgathering approval by sev-
eral levels of management.283 Some commentators believe that a
code of ethics addressing newsgathering and privacy rights would
be the only means of successfully bringing about change in the
American media.284
V. CONCLUSION
Although some legal measures exist to punish a media defend-
ant for placing an individual in fear or at risk of bodily harm, the
practical efficacy of those measures is uncertain.2 85 Commentators
and lawmakers have argued that this uncertainty limits the law's de-
terrent effect in the media context. 286 Commentators have also ar-
gued that the threat of punishment is not a major factor in
deterring conduct, especially when the benefits of engaging in the
conduct far outweigh the uncertain costs.2 87
Existing generally applicable laws are sufficient to punish
much, but not all, of the conduct that places individuals in fear or
at risk of bodily harm. 288 This inadequacy results from an unrealis-
tic application and interpretation of existing generally applicable
laws. These laws would be sufficient to punish much more irre-
sponsible media conduct if courts would extend tort principles to
take account of current technology and newsgathering practices. 289
Certain courts' prohibitions on intrusion claims for conduct in pub-
lic or semi-public places or intrusion claims that do not accompany
actionable defamation claims, further limit the efficacy of generally
282. See British Editors Tackle Broad Press Reforms, supra note 280, at A25. The
Society of Professional Journalists "code of ethics centers on four main points:
'seek truth and report it, minimize harm, act independently and be accountable.'"
Id.
283. See Steven Perry, Hidden Cameras, New Technology, and The Law, 14-FALL
COMM. LAw. 1, 19 (1996).
284. See Rush, supra note 9, at 20.
285. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 13. The unpredictability and uncertainty
of the application of generally applicable laws is one reason she and other Senators
have proposed uniform federal legislation. See id. Factors that render the applica-
tion of these laws uncertain include some courts' unwillingness to extend tort prin-
ciples to the technology and newsgathering practices of the late 1990s. See
McClurg, supra note 13, at 990-91; see also Stern, supra note 13, at 141-42.
286. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 218, at 188; Barnett, supra note 13, at 449;
Stern, supra note 13, at 116.
287. See Wilson, supra note 218, at 121.
288. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 990-95; Stern, supra note 13, at 133-34;
Hernandez, supra note 71, at 442.
289. See McClurg, supra note 13, at 992-95.
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applicable laws.2 90 A broader, more realistic application and inter-
pretation of generally applicable laws would provide more compre-
hensive punishment for outrageous conduct. Recent decisions
such as Wolfson, Shulman and Green suggest a movement towards this
more realistic interpretation and application.2 91 Clearly, the pun-
ishment currently provided by generally applicable laws is inade-
quate without recognition that members of the media can intrude
upon the right to be left alone without a physical trespass, absent
actionable defamation or in a public place.29 2
It is uncertain whether specialized legislation such as the pro-
posed Personal Privacy Protection Act could withstand judicial scru-
tiny, because it directly targets the media.293 The Supreme Court
has suggested that generally applicable laws that affect but do not
target the media are constitutional, while laws that directly target
the media and especially laws that constitute a prior restraint on
media will be constitutionally invalid.294
Additionally, challengers may argue that the proposed law is
content-based or even viewpoint-based and, as such, is not sup-
ported by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to which
its means are strictly tailored. Additional deterrence of the pro-
scribed media conduct would not constitute a compelling govern-
mental interest and, moreover, broad federal legislation would not
be strictly tailored to achieve the asserted governmental interest.295
The proposed law would provide consistency and certainty that
would augment the deterrent effects of current state law. 29 6 If en-
acted, the federal legislation would certainly increase the penalties
290. See id.; Stem, supra note 13, at 134-35; Hernandez, supra note 71, at 442.
291. For a further discussion of Wolfson, Shulman and Green, see supra notes
103-12, 171-74 and accompanying text. In all these cases public or semi-public
places have been viewed as places wherein an individual may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy.
292. See generally McClurg, supra note 13.
293. See Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1086
(1998); supra note 236 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., United States v. New York Times, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (dis-
cussing presumed unconstitutionality of prior restraints on expression).
295. Commentators have pointed to the fact that Princess Diana's fatal acci-
dent occurred in France, where French law prohibits chase conduct but clearly did
not deter it, as evidence that such legislation would be too broad to have its in-
tended deterrent effect. See Rush, supra note 9, at 20. "That laws are not the an-
swer is proved by the fact that France has a statute prohibiting 'too aggressive
invasion of privacy,' which in no way deterred the paparazzi who dogged Diana."
Id.
296. SeeJames Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 121 (1985).
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imposed for media conduct that places an individual in fear or at
risk of bodily harm. 29 7
Realistically, the media conduct here at issue endangers lives.
Consequently, without minimizing the importance of punishment,
deterrence should be the more urgent goal. While the proposed
federal legislation would provide additional certainty and consis-
tency in punishment, the threat of punishment is decidedly not a
major factor in deterrence of this behavior because the costs are far
outweighed by financial benefits. 298 This balance remains askew
and should be adjusted. Legislation will not achieve this balance as
effectively as will public scrutiny and self-regulation. 299
Press Councils imposing codes of conduct and investigating
complaints against the media have had varied levels of success.30 0 A
national press council overseeing state or regional news councils
would provide an excellent means of deterring and punishing the
egregious conduct at issue.30 1 Press Councils are especially worthy
of consideration in light of the judicial reluctance to enjoin danger-
ous newsgathering conduct.30 2 The press council could be com-
prised of a fair balance of interests or could be solely comprised of
media members. Either way, a board empowered 1) to compose
professional standards of conduct; 2) to establish due procedure
for investigating and hearing alleged violations of such standards;
297. See Spiegelman, supra note 8. Senator Hatch admitted that "the pro-
posed bill would probably not be invoked very often, if at all." Id. Senator Hatch
stated he believed that the law would have a preventative effect. See id.
298. See Wilson, supra note 296. Paparazzi can make millions of dollars from a
single photograph. See Susan Caba, supra note 213. For example, just one day
after Princess Diana's fatal car crash, "photographs of Diana dying in her wrecked
Mercedes Benz reportedly were being peddled to publishers with price tags of any
where between $250,000 to $1 million." Id.
299. See Rush, supra note 9, at 20. "[M]eaningful change in the press can be
brought about only from inside the industry. Possibly helpful would be a code of
ethics regarding news treatment of privacy rights." Id.
300. See supra, notes 243-59 and accompanying text.
301. See Rush, supra note 9, at 20. A Press Council and a standardized code of
conduct "could well be a project for study and recommendations by the American
Society of Newspaper Editors. Adoption could bring about substantial cooperation
from the bfoadsheet prcss and the legitimate tabloids and could conceivably have
some runoff effect on the supermarket scandal sheets as well." Id.; see also, Hale,
supra note 255, at 79-80 (asserting that news councils would provide viable alterna-
tive to courts for libel disputes).
302. See O'Neill, supra note 9. "Courts are rightly reluctant to enjoin report-
ers and photographers from getting at the truth, by any means .... Yet there must
be some recourse beyond self-restraint." Id. O'Neill proposes restoring and revisit-
ing the idea of a National News council, where victims of media misconduct that
may not be otherwise actionable can seek formal vindication. See id. "Unless we
are creative in fashioning a new forum for such disputes, we are likely to face an
increasingly hostile array of legal remedies." Id.
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and 3) to publish or broadcast their decisions in the state or re-
gional media would prove a valuable means of protecting First
Amendment interests and punishing unprotected conduct.303
The First Amendment interests of the press would also be bet-
ter served by a code of conduct like the one recently adopted for
the British Media, than by federal legislation.30 4 A mechanism for
enforcing such a code of professional conduct beyond a press coun-
cil investigation and publication is journalists' employment con-
tracts. Media entities could contractually obligate their employees
to work within the parameters of a code of conduct that the entities
elect to adopt. Such efforts could preserve important First Amend-
ment freedoms, while also protecting individuals from outrageous
newsgathering conduct.
Alissa Eden Halperin
303. The benefits of such a system arguably could outweigh the costs involved
in not having one. The litigation expenses saved by adjudication through a press
council, alone, can be enormous. See Hale, supra note 255, at 79-80.
304. See supra note 274 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the
recently adopted British Code of Media Conduct.
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